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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)0) provided the Utah Supreme Court with 
jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court transferred this case to 
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). This Court granted the 
interlocutory appeal on June 3, 2009. (R. 478.) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0) and Utah R. App. P. 5. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Appellants 
Wayne and Carol Welshes' (the "Welshes") Motion for a 39-day enlargement of time to 
designate expert witnesses and submit initial expert reports, where: (a) the trial court had 
already granted the Motion in an earlier ruling; (b) the Welshes had relied upon the trial 
court's first ruling granting the Motion; and (c) the extension of time that the trial court 
granted in its first ruling did not prejudice either Appellee Hospital Corporation of Utah 
d/b/a Lakeview Hospital ("Lakeview") or the trial court. The trial court's first ruling 
granting the Motion did not alter any of the dates in the scheduling order and, at the time, 
the case had yet to be set for trial or even certified as ready for trial. 
Standard of Review: In general appellate courts "review whether a trial 
court properly ruled on pretrial compliance with a scheduling order under an abuse of 
discretion standard." Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2007 UT App 382,TJ9? 174 
P.3d 1. In this case, however, the trial court initially granted the Welshes' Motion for an 
extension of time and then, after the Welshes complied with the trial court's ruling by 
designating their experts and submitting initial expert reports, the trial court reversed 
itself, without notice to the Welshes or an opportunity to respond. Subsequently, the trial 
court justified this reversal as authorized by Rule 60(a). To the extent the trial court 
based its authority to reverse itself in this manner on its interpretation of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, this Court reviews that decision as a matter of law. See Glacier Land 
Co., LLC v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs., LLC, 2006 UT App 516, ^13, 154 P.3d 852 
(observing, "to the extent the issue on appeal required the trial court 'to interpret rules of 
civil procedure, it presents a question of law which we review for correctness.' " 
(quotations and citations omitted)). 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte 
sanctioning the Welshes, for filing a Motion for a 39-day enlargement of time, by 
prohibiting their introduction of expert testimony at trial, where neither the Welshes nor 
their counsel engaged in any bad faith, intentional or willful misconduct to justify the 
extreme sanctions and where the trial court had initially granted the Motion in its first 
ruling. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's imposition of 
discovery sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 
2008 UT 82,^23, 199 P.3d 957. 
3. Issue: Whether the trial court violated the Welshes" due process rights 
when it sua sponte sanctioned the Welshes by prohibiting their introduction of expert 
testimony at trial, where: (a) the trial court did not provide the Welshes with notice or an 
opportunity to respond prior to imposing sanctions; (b) the trial court did not make the 
requisite findings of bad faith, intentional or willful misconduct prior to imposing 
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sanctions; (c) the trial court sua sponte reversed its earlier ruling granting the Motion, a 
ruling on which the Welshes relied; and (d) where neither the Welshes nor their counsel 
engaged in any bad faith, intentional or willful misconduct to justify the extreme 
sanctions. 
Standard of Review: "'Constitutional issues, including questions regarding due 
process, are questions of law that we review for correctness.'" State v. Mejia, 2007 UT 
App 337?1j8, 172 P.3d 315 (citation omitted). 
Preservation of Issues: All of these issues were preserved through the Welshes' 
Motion for Enlargement of Time, filed by the Welshes' new counsel on November 26, 
2009, and the Welshes' Motion for Relief, filed January 29, 2009. (R. 72-90; 137-39; 
213-306; 337-366.) 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Issue 1: In its April 14, 2009 Ruling on Motion for Relief Order and Entry of 
Order Enlarging Time, the trial court relied on Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to support its January 22, 2009 sua sponte reversal of its December 29, 2008 
decision granting the Welshes' Motion for a 39-day enlargement of time. Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(a) provides: 
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, 
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at 
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party 
and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
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No other statutory or constitutional provisions or other rules or regulations are 
determinative of this issue. 
Issue 2: No statutory or constitutional provisions or other rules or regulations are 
determinative of this issue. 
Issue 3: The constitutional provisions determinative on this issue are: 
1. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
2. Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
3. Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Section 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Welshes initiated the underlying action against Lakeview to recover for 
severe permanent injuries Wayne L. Welsh suffered as a direct and proximate result of 
Lakeview's negligence. Although the merits of the underlying action are not before the 
Court in this interlocutory appeal, the resolution of this appeal will likely have a 
potentially significant impact on the outcome of the underlying action. 
By this appeal, the Welshes ask this Court to reverse the unreasonable and 
unconstitutional procedural rulings and draconian sanctions that the trial court imposed in 
the midst of discovery. Shortly after the Welshes retained Rodney G. Snow and Matthew 
Steward as new counsel in November 2008, the Welshes' new counsel moved the trial 
court for a 39-day extension of time to designate experts and submit initial expert reports. 
On December 29, 2008, the trial court granted the Welshes' Motion ("December 29 
Ruling"). Pursuant to the trial court's December 29 Ruling, the Welshes retained and 
designated their experts and submitted their reports in compliance with the new deadline. 
Despite the fact that the parties were proceeding with discovery and other matters 
according to the trial court's December 29 Ruling, the trial court abruptly reversed itself 
and denied the extension it had granted less than one month earlier. The trial court 
further sua sponte sanctioned the Welshes by prohibiting the Welshes from introducing 
expert testimony at trial. {See January 22, 2009 Ruling on Motion for Enlargement of 
Time and Defendant Lakeview Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment, hereafter 
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"January 22, 2009 Order," attached as Addendum A.) It is the rulings in this Order that 
are the subject of this interlocutory appeal. 
The trial court did not make any of the requisite findings of willful misconduct by 
the Welshes or their counsel prior to imposing the extreme sanctions in the January 22, 
2009 Order. In fact, neither the Welshes nor their counsel engaged in any willful 
misconduct. Instead, the Welshes had fully complied with the trial court's ruling ind 
December 2008 Ruling granting their Motion. Nevertheless, when the Welshes' notified 
the trial court of the lack of evidence to support the sanctions in a motion seeking relief 
from the January 22, 2009 Order, the trial court affirmed the sanctions and made after-
the-fact findings to support the rulings in the January 22, 2009 Order. (See April 14, 
2009 Ruling on Motion for Relief from Order and for Entry of Order Enlarging Time, 
hereafter "April 14, 2009 Order," attached as Addendum B.) Even accepting the trial 
court's procedurally flawed post-hoc findings, those findings still fail to justify the 
imposition of sanctions against the Welshes in this matter. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The interlocutory appeal results from the trial court's procedural rulings. 
Accordingly, the primary material facts to this appeal are the course of proceedings and 
disposition below. For economy, the Welshes have provided a detailed history of the 
course of proceedings and disposition in the "Procedural Background'" section of the 
Statement of Facts, immediately below. 
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Statement of Facts 
Factual Background 
Wayne L. Welsh served as the State Auditor for the Utah Legislature for thirty 
(30) years. In September 2004, Mr. Welsh went to Lakeview Hospital, for treatment after 
suffering a syncope and a fall at an automobile repair shop. While at Lakeview Hospital, 
and despite his syncopy and complaints that he felt dizzy and nauseated, Mr. Welsh was 
improperly left alone on an elevated examination table during the administration of a 
Persantine Stress Test. While left alone, Mr. Welsh fell off of the elevated metal 
examination table where he had been left, resulting in a fracture to his skull and massive 
subdural hematoma and eventual coma. Despite emergency brain surgery at the 
University of Utah Medical Center, Mr. Welsh remained in the coma for several days. 
Mr. Welsh suffered significant brain damage that has devastated both his and his wife's 
quality of life, requiring extensive care, for which they seek redress. (R. 2-9, 218-19.) 
Procedural Background 
1. The Welshes filed their Complaint against Lakeview in this action on 
February 27, 2006, and completed service of process on Lakeview March 7, 2006. (R. 1-
14; see also 'Trial Court's Docket," April 20, 2009, attached as Addendum C.) 
2. From the time the Complaint was filed through approximately November 
2008, the Welshes' counsel on this case was Nathan Wilcox. Mr. Wilcox was a 
shareholder in the law firm Anderson & Karrenberg through October 2009, when he 
became in-house counsel of a Utah county company. Mr. Wilcox remained associated 
with Anderson & Karrenberg in an "of-counsel" capacity. He left Anderson & 
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Karrenberg in June 2008. Anderson & Karrenberg withdrew as counsel for the Welshes 
on June 19, 2008. After leaving Anderson & Karrenberg, Mr. Wilcox became "of 
counsel" with Clyde Snow & Sessions. However, there was inevitable delay in 
transitioning active cases that Anderson & Karrenberg could not handle to Clyde Snow & 
Sessions, including the instant matter. (R. 56-58, 76, 341.) 
3. A scheduling order in this case was entered by the trial court on August 4, 
2006 (R. 29-34.) 
4. Counsel for Plaintiff requested a scheduling conference with the trial court 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 16 on February 14, 2007. The requested scheduling 
conference was conducted by telephone on May 4, 2007. (R. 35-37; see also Trial 
Court's Docket.) 
5. Immediately following the May 4, 2007 telephone conference, Mr. Wilcox 
sent a letter to Lakeview's counsel to set up depositions of several of Lakeview's key 
employees. Lakeview's counsel did not respond with available deposition dates. (See R. 
343-44; 355-56; see also May 4, 2007 Letter, attached as Addendum D.) 
6. The parties' counsel also executed a stipulated amended scheduling order 
following the May 4, 2007 conference. (R. 42-47; see also Trial Court's Docket.) 
7. On July 10, 2007, Mr. Wilcox sent Lakeview's counsel a follow-up letter 
(to the May 4, 2007 letter), again requesting the depositions of key Lakeview employees. 
Once again, this request went unanswered and Lakeview did not make the requested 
employees available for deposition or provide a single date. (R. 225; 343-44; 358-59; see 
also July 10, 2007 Letter, attached as Addendum E.) 
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8. In January of 2008, the parties' counsel again met and executed a proposed 
amended scheduling order. Lakeview's counsel prepared this amended scheduling order 
and submitted it to the trial court for execution. The trial court executed it on 
February 11, 2008. (R. 50-55; see also Trial Court's Docket.) 
9. In August 2008, the parties' counsel (including Mr. Wilcox for the 
Welshes) again met and executed the final amended scheduling order. Lakeview's 
counsel prepared this amended scheduling order and filed it on August 28, 2008. (R. 61-
66; see also Trial Court's Docket.) 
10. The trial court scheduled a telephone conference on September 30, 2008 to 
discuss the final amended scheduling order. During the scheduling conference, Mr. 
Wilcox indicated that the case was progressing slowly, in part, because Lakeview's 
counsel was not cooperating in his requests to depose Lakeview's witnesses and 
employees. Following the telephone conference, the trial court executed the final 
amended scheduling order on September 30, 2008 ("September 2008 Scheduling Order," 
attached as Addendum F). This Scheduling Order also included a handwritten note 
stating "Last amended order[.] [C]ase to move along or it will be dismissed[.]" (R. 61-
66; see also Trial Court's Docket.) 
11. The September 2008 Scheduling Order, inter alia, set a date of 
December 1, 2008 for the Welshes to designate expert witnesses and submit initial expert 
reports. {See September 2008 Scheduling Order, ^|2(d).) 
12. The transition of the Welsh case to Clyde Snow & Sessions was completed 
in November 2008. The undersigned counsel, Rodney G. Snow and Matthew A. Steward 
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became new counsel for the Welshes in this matter in November of 2008, entering 
notices of appearances on November 26, 2008. (R. 71-72, 76.) 
13. Upon taking over the case, Mr. Snow and Mr. Steward realized it would be 
difficult to complete the initial expert reports by the December 1, 2008 deadline. Mr. 
Steward first contacted Lakeview's counsel to discuss extending the expert report 
deadlines, and again requested dates to take Lakeview's employee's depositions. 
Lakeview's counsel, having never provided a single date for the depositions of any of 
Lakeview's employees, refused to stipulate to the extension. However, Lakeview's 
counsel agreed that the requested depositions could be taken after the discovery deadline 
of the current Scheduling Order. (R. 70-71; 343-44; 361-62; see also November 20, 2008 
Letter from Mr. Steward to Mr. Riekhof, attached as Addendum G.) 
14. Unable to obtain a stipulation from Lakeview's counsel, the Welshes' 
counsel filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time on November 26, 2008. This Motion 
was filed before the expiration of the existing deadline and sought an extension of time 
from December 1, 2008 until January 9, 2009 to provide Plaintiffs' initial expert 
disclosures and expert reports to Lakeview. Pursuant to the Motion, Lakeview was also 
to receive an extension of time to file initial expert reports from January 31, 2009 until 
February 13,2009. (R. 72-74.) 
15. The Welshes' counsel did not seek to change any other dates in the 
September 2008 Scheduling Order, including the certification of readiness for trial set for 
June 2009, through the Motion. (R. 72-74; see also September 2008 Scheduling Order, 
p. 4.) 
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16. The grounds for the enlargement of time were, inter alia, that the Welshes 
had recently obtained new counsel and Lakeview had failed cooperate in the deposition 
of its employees—specifically, the lab technician, Mr. Alan Kunnard, who left Mr. Welsh 
unattended and was a key witness to the alleged negligence. Lakeview's failure to make 
its employees available for deposition, despite repeated requests and the fact that the 
Welshes allowed Lakeview to take their depositions, caused a delay in the completion of 
fact discovery and, in turn, a delay in the exchange of expert reports. (R. 72-73, 76-77.) 
17. Briefing was completed on Plaintiffs' Motion for Enlargement of Time and 
the Welshes' filed a Request to Submit for Decision on December 16, 2008. (R. 178-80.) 
18. On December 29, 2008, the Court entered the following ruling on 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Enlargement of Time on its docket: 
12-29-08 Note: Mr. Steward's [Plaintiffs' counsel] Motion 
to Enlarge Time is granted, last time. He needs to submit an 
order. I called his office this date. 
(See Trial Court's Docket (emphasis added).) 
19. As indicated on the Trial Court's Docket, the trial court's clerk also called 
Mr. Steward on December 29, 2008 and informed him that the Welshes' Motion to 
Enlarge Time was granted. (See Trial Court's Docket.) 
20. In accordance with this December 29, 2008 Ruling ("December 29 
Ruling"), the Welshes' counsel prepared and filed a proposed Order on January 14, 2009, 
pursuant Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f), for entry by the trial court. The proposed Order was 
approved as to form by Lakeview's counsel. (R. 198-201; see Proposed Order, attached 
hereto as Addendum H.) 
11 
21. Based upon the trial court's December 29 Ruling, the Weslshes' counsel 
completed their expert designations and served their initial reports upon Defendant's 
counsel by the January 9, 2009 deadline. (R. 140-42; 202-03.) 
22. The Welshes' expert witnesses include: (1) Feras Bader, M.D., FACC; 
(2) Candace Jae Winter, BSN, RN, CCM, CLCP; and (3) Kelly R. Johnson, MVA, 
CPA/ABV, DABFA. That these experts are critical to the Welshes should have been 
obvious to all parties and the trial court. For example: 
a. Dr. Bader provided an expert opinion that Lakeview clearly violated 
the standard of care in its treatment of Mr. Welsh. (R. 241-46.) 
b. Candace Winter is a life care specialist who provided an expert 
opinion on Mr. Welsh's needs and condition over the remainder of his life. (R. 273, 
279.) 
c. Kelly Johnson is a forensic accountant who provided an expert 
opinion on the economic loss incurred by Mr. Welsh as a result of the injuries he 
sustained from Lakeview's negligent treatment, including future injury-related expenses, 
past and future lost income, past medical expenses, and other criteria. Mr. Johnson 
calculated Mr. Welsh's economic loss from the negligent treatment at $1,357,343.00. 
(R. 272-96.) 
23. The Welshes' and their counsel relied on the phone call from the trial 
court's clerk, as well as the trial court's December 29 Ruling noted on the docket 
granting their Motion for Enlargement of Time. Considerable time and money were 
spent producing the reports by the January 9, 2009 deadline. (R. 222-23.) 
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24. Also based upon the trial court's December 29 Ruling granting the Motion 
for Enlargement of Time, counsel for the Welshes and Lakeview had been actively 
working on scheduling the depositions of the Welshes' expert witnesses and pursuing 
mediation. This case was on its way to being resolved until derailed and further delayed 
by the trial court's inexplicable reversal of its December ruling. (R. 223, 458; see also 
January 13, 2009 Letter from Mark A. Reikhof to Matthew A. Steward, attached as 
Addendum I.) 
The January 22, 2009 Order 
25. On January 22, 2009, the trial court entered a Ruling on Motion for 
Enlargement of Time and Defendant Lakeview Hospital's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (''January 22 Order," attached as Addendum A.). As part of the January 22 
Order, the trial court sua sponte reversed the December 29 Ruling, without notice or an 
opportunity to be heard, and denied the Welshes' Motion for Enlargement of Time. 
(January 22 Order, p. 5.) In addition, once again without hearing or notice, the trial court 
sanctioned the Welshes pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d) and 37(b)(2)(B) by prohibiting 
the Welshes "from introducing any expert testimony at trial regarding their claims," {id., 
p. 6), apparently as a sanction for the Welshes' filing of a Motion to enlarge time to 
submit initial expert reports, which Motion the trial court initially granted. 
26. The trial court did not make any findings of bad faith, fault, or 
intentional/willful misconduct by the Welshes to support its imposition of sanctions 
against the Welshes in its January 22 Order reversing its December 29 Ruling. (See 
January 22 Order.) 
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27. Indeed, while Lakeview opposed the Welshes' Motion for Enlargement of 
Time, Lakeview did not seek the extreme and unjustified sanction imposed by the trial 
court. Moreover, Lakeview did not claim to be prejudiced by an enlargement of time. 
(R. 103-34.) 
28. The January 22 Order was not a final order on this issue. Rather, the trial 
court directed Lakeview's counsel to prepare an order consistent with the trial court's 
ruling. (See January 22 Order, p. 8.) Lakeviewfs counsel never prepared the Order as 
directed. 
29. Following the January 22 Order, Lakeview refused to make its witnesses 
available for depositions and reneged on its previous request to mediate the dispute.1 
(R. 462-63; see also February 17, 2009 Letter from Mark A. Reikhof to Matthew A. 
Steward, attached as Addendum J.) 
The April 14, 2009 Order 
30. On January 29, 2009, the Welshes filed a Motion for Relief from the 
January 22 Order and for Entry of Order Enlarging Time pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 
60(b)(7), and requested oral argument ("Motion for Relief). (R. 213-306.) 
31. Although Lakeview opposed the Welshes' Motion for Relief, it again did 
not claim any prejudice would result from the trial court reinstating its December 29 
Ruling granting the Welshes a 39-day extension of time. (R. 317-36.) 
1
 Following the Welshes' filing of their Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, Lakeview 
again changed its posture by agreeing to meditation. Lakeview and the Welshes met for 
meditation in June 2009, which was unfortunately unsuccessful, in large part because of 
the trial court's January 22 Order. 
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32. Briefing was completed on the Welshes' Motion for Relief, and oral 
argument was requested, on February 23, 2009. (R. 337-66; 367-69 see also Trial 
Court's Docket.) 
33. By written decision dated April 14, 2009, however, the trial court denied 
the Welshes' Motion for Relief without a hearing (See "April 14 Order," attached as 
Addendum B.) 
34. In the April 14 Order, to support its sua sponte imposition of sanctions, the 
trial court made an after-the-fact finding of "willfulness" by Welshes in failing to meet 
the expert report deadline. The trial court also stated that (a) the December 29 Ruling on 
which the parties had relied was not an order or other binding determination from the trial 
court and that (b) even if it were binding, it was subject to correction as a "clerical" error. 
The trial court further stated that, despite its December 29 Ruling, the Welshes were not 
prejudiced by the reversal because filing a motion does not excuse their duty to comply 
with the scheduled dates. (See April 14 Order, pp. 5-11.) 
35. The April 14 Order was the final order of the trial court on this issue, 
indicating that no further order was necessary. (See April 14 Order, p. 11.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court first abused its discretion by granting and then inexplicably 
denying the Welshes' request for a 39-day extension of time to designate experts and 
submit initial expert reports. The Welshes' request was reasonable and was properly 
granted, given (a) the relatively short extension sought; (b) the Welshes' acquisition of 
new counsel; (c) the fact that no other dates in the Scheduling Order were to be affected; 
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(d) the fact that trial was not yet scheduled; (e) the fact that Lakeview failed to produce 
witnesses for depositions; and (f) the overall lack of prejudice to either the trial court or 
Lakeview. 
In fact, the trial court initially agreed with the reasonableness of the requested 
extension, granting the Welshes' Motion on December 29, 2008. The Welshes incurred 
considerable expense designating experts and submitting initial expert reports by the new 
deadline. The trial court's unexplained sua sponte reversal of its December 29, 2008 
Ruling on January 22, 2009 was an abuse of discretion and was founded upon errors of 
law. Contrary to the trial court' $ post-hoc justification, it could not simply reverse its 
ruling based on authority stemming from Rule 60(a) for correcting clerical errors, 
particularly once the Welshes were notified of and relied upon the trial court's ruling of 
December 29, 2008. A change from "motion granted" to "motion denied" is not clerical, 
but a substantive exercise at judicial authority. The trial court's actions in this case must 
be reversed as they were inequitable and unduly prejudicial to Welshes—Plaintiffs who 
were very seriously damaged by Lakeview's negligence. 
2. The trial court next abused its discretion by sua sponte sanctioning the 
Welshes by precluding their use of expert testimony at trial, without a motion from 
Lakeview seeking sanctions, and without the proper findings and evidentiary support. 
Utah law requires a finding of intentional misconduct, from facts in the record, before 
sanctions are justified. The trial court did not make any such findings, nor could it have, 
against the Welshes or their counsel in its January 22, 2009 Order imposing sanctions. 
This was error. 
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Rather than correct its error by reversing the sanctions, once the Welshes notified 
the trial court of the lack of evidentiary basis, the trial court attempted to breathe life into 
its flawed sanctions by making an after-the-fact finding of willfulness in its April 14, 
2009 Order. Even then, however, the trial court could not identify any affirmative 
intentional misconduct by the Welshes or their counsel. Instead, it implied willfulness 
from the fact that the Welshes did not argue unforeseen circumstances, surprise or other 
such excuse. While unforeseen circumstances or surprise could excuse a failure to 
comply with the Scheduling Order—indeed, the delays in Mr. Wilcox's transition from 
private practice to general counsel were unforeseen—not citing such an excuse does not 
render alleged non-compliance willful. Furthermore, the Welshes had complied with the 
trial court's December 29 Ruling, thereby eviscerating any finding of willful 
noncompliance. The facts of the case do not support the imposition of sanctions here as 
against the Welshes or their counsel. 
Moreover, even assuming the trial court could properly impose sanctions by 
implying intentional misconduct against the Welshes' counsel, this does not support an 
imposition of sanctions against the Welshes personally, particularly where the sanctions 
deprive the Welshes of a fair trial. "[W]here discovery sanctions are concerned, 'if the 
fault lies with the attorneys, that is where the impact of the sanction should be lodged.'" 
Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82,T|39, 199 P.3d 957 (citation omitted), 
There is no evidence establishing that the Welshes willfully failed to comply with the 
September 2008 Scheduling Order. Thus, the trial court further abused its discretion by 
imposing severe sanctions against the Welshes without any evidentiary support. 
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3. The trial court's after-the-fact imposition of sanctions, without evidentiary 
basis, also violated the Welshes' due process rights in at least three ways. First, the 
Welshes were not given notice or an opportunity to respond before the trial court sua 
sponte reversed its December 29 Ruling and denied their fundamental rights to a fair trial. 
Second, the trial court's sua sponte, after-the-fact finding of implied willfulness deprived 
the Welshes of an opportunity to rebut or answer for the conduct for which it imposed 
sanctions. Finally, trial court made no inquiry and ordered no hearing or fact-finding 
procedure to determine whether the Welshes were to blame or whether they had any 
defenses that might absolve them of responsibility for the discovery violation. This 
deprived the Welshes of their due process rights of notice and opportunity to be heard 
prior to the imposition of punitive sanctions aimed at defeating their right to a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
While the trial court has discretion to consider requests to amend a scheduling 
order and to impose sanctions for violations of a scheduling order, that discretion is not 
unbridled. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has cautioned trial courts against overzealous 
use of their discretionary authority: 
Fundamental to the concept of the rule of law is the 
principle that reason and justice shall prevail over the 
arbitrary and uncontrolled will of any one person; and that 
this applies to all men in every status: to courts and judges, 
as well as to autocrats or bureaucrats. The meaning of the 
term 'discretion' itself imports that the action should be 
taken within reason and good conscience in the interest of 
protecting the rights of both parties and serving the ends of 
justice. It has always been the policy of our law to resolve 
doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in 
court on the merits of a controversy. 
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Carmen v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); 
accord Carlson v. Carlson, 584 P.2d 864, 865 (Utah 1978) ("[Discretionary power is 
not absolute, but must be exercised with reason and good conscience upon a 
foundation of facts so justifying." (emphasis added)). Rather than exercise the 
temperance required by the Supreme Court, the trial court used its authority rashly and 
abusively to put the Welshes—the injured parties—in a potentially disadvantageous 
position at trial. 
The Welshes have lost their right to present expert testimony regarding the 
standard of care and damages, even though they are completely innocent of any 
intentional or willful misconduct. Lakeview, on the other hand, would presumably have 
the full use of expert testimony, even though it caused to many of the delays in this case 
by refusing to produce its employees for depositions and even though it stipulated all 
previous amendments to the scheduling order (even preparing some). Thus, although 
counsel on both sides contributed to the delays in this case, the trial court has punished 
only the Welshes. Without expert testimony, the Welshes will have a significantly more 
difficult case to establish Lakeview's negligence. Even if they are able to establish 
Lakeview's negligence, it will be difficult at best, to obtain full redress for their injuries 
without economic experts and life care specialists. Given the Welshes' blamelessness, 
such action must be reversed. 
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I. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Sua Sponte Reversing its December 
29 Ruling and Denying the Welshes' Request for a Reasonable Extension of 
Time to Submit Initial Expert Reports. 
The Welshes' Motion to Enlarge Time to submit initial expert reports was a 
reasonable request with no prejudice to the trial court or Lakeview. Lakeview did not 
claim prejudice. The Welshes were precluded from completing their expert reports by 
the December 1, 2008 deadline in part as a result of Lakeview's refusal to make Mr. 
Kunnard, Lakeview's employee and a key witness to the negligence in this case, 
available for deposition, despite repeated requests from the Welshes' counsel. (See Fact 
Nos. 5, 7 10, 13, 16, and 29; Addenda D, E, G, and J.) In addition, the Welshes obtained 
new counsel in November 2008, who quickly realized that it would be difficult to meet 
the December 1, 2008 deadline to designate experts and submit initial expert reports. 
As such, the Welshes' new counsel filed a Motion for an Enlargement of Time, 
seeking an additional five weeks, until January 9, 2009. The Motion did not impact the 
June-of-2009 date the trial court set to certify the case as ready for trial. (See September 
2008 Scheduling Order, p. 4.) Based on this schedule, the earliest this case would have 
been set for trial was the third or fourth quarter 2009. Pursuant to the Motion for 
Enlargement of Time, the January 9, 2009 date for the production of initial expert reports 
was still seven or eight months before the matter was actually going to trial. The 
Welshes promptly completed their expert reports by January 9, 2009. 
Lakeview, although opposing the Motion for an Enlargement of Time, never 
argued that it would suffer any prejudice from the extension and such an argument would 
have been disingenuous in any event. Given the circumstances of this case, including the 
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demonstrated lack of prejudice, the Welshes should be given the opportunity to fully 
present their case on the merits, including expert testimony. See Carmen, 546 P.2d at 
603; see also Boice ex. rel Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71,1(10, 982 P.2d 565 ("[Jjustice 
and fairness will require that a court allow a party to designate witnesses, conduct 
discovery, or otherwise perform tasks covered by a scheduling order after the court-
imposed deadline for doing so has expired."). 
Apparently recognizing the justice and fairness in an extension of the expert 
deadline, the trial court unequivocally granted the Welshes' Motion on December 29, 
2008, and directed the Welshes' counsel to prepare a conforming Order. {See Fact Nos. 
18-19; Addendum C.) The trial court's clerk confirmed this ruling by placing a telephone 
call to Mr. Steward on December 29, 2008. {See Fact No. 19; Addendum C.) The trial 
court memorialized its ruling in its minute entry. (Id.) Based on the December 29 
Ruling, including the clerk's phone call, Mr. Steward prepared a proposed Order for entry 
by the trial court, which was approved by Lakeview's counsel. (See Addendum H.) In 
reliance on the trial court's ruling, the Welshes incurred considerable expense in 
completing their expert reports in accordance with the January 9, 2009 deadline ordered 
by the court. 
Despite this, however, on January 22, 2009—nearly three weeks after the Welshes 
sent their expert reports to Lakeview per the December 29 Ruling—the trial court 
reversed its December 29 Ruling sua sponte. As a result, the Welshes have been 
prejudiced as this change substantially impacts their right to a fair trial on the merits. 
There can be little debate regarding the benefit expert testimony can provide to a litigant 
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at trial. This benefit is particularly compelling where, as here, the case involves serious 
permanent and life threatening injuries and significant economic damages. The jury, 
seeing the Welshes' lack of expert testimony, may infer that they were unable to find any 
experts to support their position. For example, without a Dr. Bader's expert testimony, 
the Welshes could lose their ability to establish Lakeview's negligence. Without 
Candace Winter's expert testimony regarding the life care plan for Mr. Welsh, and Kelly 
Johnson's expert testimony regarding Mr. Welsh's economic damages, the Welshes will 
have a very difficult time establishing the full extent of their $1.3 million dollar economic 
(special) damages. Lakeview will presumably produce its own experts to opine that not 
only was it not negligent, but that the Welshes have suffered little damage. The jury will 
not have the benefit of considering competing expert testimony and assessing relative 
credibility. 
Notwithstanding the impact of its decision, the trial court offered no explanation 
for the reversal in its January 22 Order, not even acknowledging the December 29 Ruling 
or the Welshes' reliance thereon. Although the trial court addressed the issue in the 
April 14 Order, it wholly disregarded the prejudice to the Welshes from the sua sponte 
reversal. 
1
 See Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT 9JJ, 179 P.3d 754 (observing that expert 
testimony is usually necessary in a medical malpractice case). Here, the trial court 
correctly ruled that Lakeview was not entitled to summary judgment despite the Welshes' 
inability to provide expert testimony, as the malpractice was within the common 
knowledge of the layman. (See January 22 Order, p. 7-8; see also Bowman, 2008 UT 9 at 
l|j9). Nevertheless, the lack of expert testimony will make the Welshes' task at trial much 
more difficult, as explained above. 
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Instead, the trial court concluded that (a) December 29 Ruling was not the ruling 
of the court; (b) even if it were the ruling, the court was free to modify orders or 
judgments "entered by mistake or inadvertence which do not accurately reflect the result 
of its judgment"; and (c) there was no prejudice to the Welshes because the "mere filing 
of a motion for enlargement of time did not relieve the plaintiffs of their duty . . . to serve 
expert designations and reports on December 1, 2008." (See April 14 Order, p. 8.) 
This rationale misses the mark. The facts are that the trial court did indicate on its 
docket that the Welshes' Motion was granted and the trial court's clerk called Mr. 
Steward to inform him of the Court's ruling and instruct him to prepare an order in 
conformity therewith. It was not uncommon in this case for the clerk to relay the trial 
court's rulings or even appear to execute Orders on Judge Allphin's behalf. For example, 
with respect to both the February 12, 2008 and September 30, 2008 Scheduling Orders, 
the copies sent to the Welshes' counsel were signed by an undisclosed party, presumably 
the trial court's clerk, on behalf of Judge Allphin/ For all intents and purposes, the 
December 29 Ruling was the ruling of the trial court as of December 29, 2008. The 
Welshes and their counsel acted reasonably in relying upon this ruling and the Welshes' 
are prejudiced by the trial court's sua sponte reversal as it goes to their right to obtain a 
fair trial on the merits. 
Copies of the scheduling orders dated February 12, 2008 and September 30, 2008 
that were sent to the Welshes' counsel are attached as Addenda K and L to this brief, 
respectively. The corresponding scheduling orders in the official court record appear to 
be signed by Judge Allphin. The Welshes' counsel was unaware of this discrepancy until 
it reviewed the record on appeal and is not certain as to the reason. 
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Moreover, the authority to correct "clerical mistakes" that the trial court relied on 
to "correct" the December 29 Ruling is derived from Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) and is not 
applicable to this situation. Utah courts have "drawn a distinction between clerical 
errors, which a court may correct, and judicial errors, which it may not." Frito-Lay v. 
Labor Com % 2008 UT App 314,TJ14, 193 P.3d 665 (quotations and citation omitted). 
"The distinction . . . does not depend upon who made it. Rather it depends on whether it 
was made in rendering a judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered." Id. 
(quotations and citation omitted); see also Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 
1201, 1206 (Utah 1983) ("[I]t matters little whether the error was made by the court 
clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the judge himself. . . ."). 
A clerical error exists when without evident intention one 
word is written for another, when the statement of some 
detail is omitted the lack of which is not a cause of nullity, or 
when there are mistakes in proper names or amounts made in 
copying but which do not change the general sense of a 
record;. . . a mistake which naturally excludes any idea that 
its insertion was made in the exercise of any judgment or 
discretion . . . . 
Frito-Lay, 2008 UT App 314 at TJ14 n. 2 (emphasis added) (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
Following these principles, the purported "error," in the December 29 Ruling, 
while ostensibly made by the clerk, is not an error capable of sua sponte correction by the 
trial court under Rule 60(a). The change from "motion granted" under the December 29 
Ruling, to "motion denied" under the January 22 Order, is not clerical, but rather a 
substantive exercise of judicial authority. The trial court's rationale for its reversal 
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indicates that the trial court simply changed its mind. (See April 14 Order, pp. 3, 7-8.) 
Such a ruling is not permitted to be reversed sua sponte, particularly because notice of the 
ruling had been given to the parties, was relied upon by the Welshes to their determinant, 
and because reversal of that ruling affects the Welshes' substantial rights going forward 
by jeopardizing their right to a full and fair trial on the merits.4 See Richards v. 
Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143, 317 (Utah 1970) (indicating "[judicial errors 
in judgments are to be corrected by appeal or writ of error, or by certiorari, or by 
awarding a new trial, or by any means specially provided by statute, and not by 
amendment"); Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f) (permitting vacation or modification only of orders 
"made without notice to the adverse party"). 
II. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Sanctioning the Welshes Because 
the Sanctions Lacked a Proper Evidentiary Basis. 
A sanction that excludes evidence is an extreme sanction, particularly where the 
sanction excludes the evidence of a party bringing suit for redress of severe personal 
injuries. See, e.g., United States v. Golyvansky, 291 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002) 
("It would be a rare case where, absent bad faith, a district court should exclude 
evidence rather than continue the proceedings." (emphasis added)). "An abuse of 
discretion may be demonstrated by showing that the district court relied on an 'erroneous 
conclusion of law' or that there was ;no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.'" 
Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82 at ^|23. Here, the trial court's imposition of sanctions against the 
Welshes lacks evidentiary basis, violates the Welshes' due process rights, is contrary to 
In addition, the trial court's sua sponte reversal violates the Welshes' due process 
rights, as explained in Section III, below. 
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law, and is unduly punitive. See, e.g., Golyvansky, 291 F.3d at 1249 ("In the absence of a 
finding of bad faith, the court should impose the least severe sanction that will 
accomplish prompt and full compliance with the discovery order."). 
A. The record fails to demonstrate any intentional misconduct by the 
Welshes or their counsel, making the imposition of sanctions an abuse 
of discretion. 
Sanctions are warranted only where "(1) the party's behavior was willful; (2) the 
party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court can attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the 
party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process." 
Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82 at }^25 (quotations and citation omitted). Where the party is 
sanctioned, the circumstances of the case must clearly demonstrate "aggravated 
misconduct," "willful disobedience" or some other "intentional" misbehavior by the 
party. See id. at ^[29-30, 33 (citation omitted) (observing, "in this list [of sanctionable 
conduct], willfulness, bad faith, and persistent dilatory tactics all involve intentional 
behavior"). 
For example, in Kilpatrick, an asbestos-related tort litigation, the Supreme Court 
held that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the plaintiffs' claims as 
sanctions for violating the case management order by failing to obtain an autopsy— 
essentially a failure to preserve evidence by the party itself. 2008 UT 82 at ]f24. The 
Supreme Court held: 
It was improper for the district court to dismiss the plaintiffs' 
claims absent a factual finding that plaintiffs' failures to 
procure the autopsies were willful. The willfulness 
requirement cannot be satisfied by showing mere prejudice. 
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Rather, there must be evidence that the noncompliance was 
the product of willful failure. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Likewise, in Bonneville Billing & Collections v. Wall, 2008 UT App 35, 2008 WL 
256584 (unpublished mem. decision), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the trial court 
abused its discretion by striking the defendant's answer and entering default judgment 
against him for failure to participate in a court-ordered pretrial mediation conference. Id. 
at * 1. In so holding, the Bonneville Court observed that there were no findings that the 
defendant's actions were willful or part of''series of other actions indicating [the 
defendant] was not respectful of the district court's orders." Id. The circumstances did 
not warrant the sanctions or suffice to override "the supreme court's admonition that our 
policy is to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court." Id5 
The Tenth Circuit similarly requires evidence of bad faith or affirmative 
misconduct prior to imposing extreme sanctions. In United States v. Ivory, for example, 
the Tenth Circuit reversed, as an abuse of discretion, sanctions against the government 
excluding evidence for a violation of a discovery order. 131 Fed. Appx. 628, 631 (10th 
Cir. 2005). The Ivory Court found that, because of the lack of bad faith and prejudice to 
In Carmen v. Slavens, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its 
discretion by striking the defendant's pleadings and entering judgment against him as a 
sanction for failure to appear at a deposition. See 546 P.2d at 603. Although the 
defendant and his attorney were served with the notice of deposition, and the defendant 
offered no justification for his failure to appear other than at the time of the deposition he 
was not represented by counsel, "under the circumstances shown . . . the interests of 
justice will best be served by vacating the [sanctioning] order and remanding the case for 
trial." Id at 603. 
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the defendant, the case was "not that rare case" where the trial court should exclude 
evidence rather than continue the proceedings, 
particularly given that the trial was not underway (nor had 
the jury been empaneled), and a relatively short 
continuance (one month according to defense counsel at 
oral argument) would solve the problem with respect to 
[defendant] without impairing his speedy trial rights. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Welshes and their counsel are even more innocent of any intentional 
misconduct than the appellants in the above cases. Unlike these appellants, the Welshes 
did not disregard an existing case management order, but rather filed a Motion for a short 
extension of time, prior to the expiration of the existing deadline. This Motion was 
initially granted by the trial court and after the Welshes complied with the new deadline 
by timely submitting their expert reports. 
Tellingly, in the January 22 Order, the trial court did not make any of the four 
requisite findings necessary to impose discovery sanctions against the Welshes. Only 
after the Welshes pointed out this omission in their Motion for Relief, the trial court 
made an after-the-fact finding of "willfulness" by the Welshes in the April 14 Order. 
This is improper. 
The trial court found the Welshes willfully failed to comply with the September 
2008 Scheduling Order because 
they were well aware of the expert discovery deadlines within 
the Court's [September 2008 Scheduling Order] and of the 
Court's prior admonishments regarding the slow progress of 
the case. The plaintiffs also have asserted neither surprise, 
unforeseen circumstances, nor any other legitimate excuse for 
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the default. Accordingly, and particularly in light of the 
Court's prior admonishments, the Court finds that at a 
minimum, the plaintiffs' failure to comply was willful in that 
the plaintiffs' failure to comply was not due to involuntary 
noncompliance. 
(April 14 Order, p. 10.) 
Rather than holding a hearing, issuing an order to show cause, or initiating other 
fact finding proceedings on January 22, 2009, trial court rashly imposed sanctions sua 
sponte to punish the Welshes for seeking additional time to submit expert reports—a 
Motion that the trial court ironically granted less than a month earlier. Then, when 
questioned about the justification for sanctioning the Welshes for filing a Motion that the 
trial court actually granted, the trial court attempted to justify its sanctions after-the-fact. 
The trial court even refused the Welshes' request for a hearing on this issue in connection 
with their Motion for Relief. Instead, in the April 14 Order, the trial court remarkably 
implied willful disregard by the Welshes from the fact that the scheduling order in place 
prior to the trial court's December 29 Ruling contained a deadline and the Welshes did 
not assert surprise or unforeseen circumstances for failing to meet that deadline. (Id.) 
The trial court's finding of implied willfulness is error. To impose sanctions, the 
"record in this case" must "demonstrate willful disobedience of the CMO [Case 
Management Order]." Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82 at ]f30. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, 
the mere fact that the Welshes did not cite surprise or unforeseen circumstances in 
support of their motions does not support a finding that either the Welshes or their 
counsel willfully disregarded the Scheduling Order. The sanctions were sua sponte, the 
Welshes had no opportunity to provide any excuse. Indeed, the delays caused by Mr. 
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Wilcox's transition from private practice to general counsel of a Utah county company 
and the transfer of the case to new counsel at Clyde Snow & Sessions were unforeseen. 
The transition was an understandably complex and meticulous process, involving multi-
party discussions regarding which cases would be transferred from Anderson & 
Karrenberg, conflict checks, determining who at Clyde Snow would undertake the 
representation, discussing the transfer with the clients, etc. 
However, not citing an excuse such as unforeseen circumstances does not 
automatically make any non-compliance willful. There must be some other conduct, 
prior to the time excuse is given for that conduct, that would indicate the conduct 
amounted to a willful disregard. See id. at p 5 ("In cases meriting sanctions, there is 
often a consistent pattern of behavior disregarding discovery requirements or court 
orders . . . . " ) . 
Neither the Welshes' nor their counsel's conduct fits this description. Rather the 
facts in the record demonstrate a lack intentional misconduct by either the Welshes or 
their counsel. These facts include: 
• There is no evidence that the Welshes or their counsel disregarded court 
orders or other discovery requirements. Even with the purportedly 
"missed" December 1, 2008 deadline for expert designations and reports, 
the Welshes did not simply disregard that deadline, but in advance of this 
deadline, filed a Motion for a 39-day enlargement of time. That Motion was 
granted and the Welshes completed and served their expert designations 
and reports by the new January 9, 2009 deadline that the trial court set in 
the December 29 Ruling. (See Fact Nos. 12-14,20-23.) 
• Lakeview's conduct contributed significantly to the delays in this case. 
Lakeview's counsel stipulated to the previous amendments to the 
scheduling order, even preparing two of the Scheduling Orders. {See Fact 
Nos. 8-9.) Lakeview further ignored the repeated requests from the 
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Welshes' counsel to make its employees available for depositions, which 
delayed the Welshes' ability to complete their expert reports. (See Fact 
Nos. 5, 7, 10, 13, 16, 29; see also Addenda D, E, G, J.) 
• The Welshes obtained the undersigned counsel as new counsel in 
November 2008, after their previous counsel, Mr. Wilcox, became general 
counsel to a Utah County company. The Welshes' new counsel, who 
entered their appearances on November 26, 2008, realized that completing 
the expert disclosures and reports by December 1, 2008 would be difficult. 
As such, new counsel requested and were initially granted a five-week 
extension of time to submit their expert designations and initial expert 
reports, which deadline they met. (See Fact Nos. 2, 12-13.) 
• There is no prejudice to either Lakeview or the trial court from the 
Welshes' Motion for an Enlargement of Time. Because no other dates in 
the September 2008 Scheduling Order were to be altered, the extension of 
the expert deadline would not have delayed trial or resolution of the case. 
Lakeview acknowledged this by failing to assert at any point that it was 
prejudiced by the extension. 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its authority by sanctioning the Welshes 
without any evidence of intentional misconduct by the Welshes or their counsel. This 
Court should reverse that trial court's imposition of sanctions and remand the case for a 
fair trial in which all parties are permitted to present all relevant evidence. 
B. The Welshes themselves are completely blameless for any delays, 
making the imposition of sanctions against them personally an 
independent abuse of discretion. 
Even if there were facts to support the trial court's finding of willful 
noncompliance with the September 2008 Scheduling Order, which there are not, this 
would not justify the imposition of extreme sanctions against the Welshes personally. At 
best, it might warrant sanctions against the Welshes' counsel. 
31 
"[W]here discovery sanctions are concerned, 'if the fault lies with the attorneys, 
that is where the impact of the sanction should be lodged.'" Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82 at 
TJ39 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court explained: 
Our case law resists sanctioning a party whose 
noncompliance is due to someone else's failure. For 
example, in Depew v. Sullivan, [2003 UT App 152, 71 P.3d 
601] a client failed to provide tax returns in satisfaction of a 
discovery request despite a court order compelling a response. 
The district court ordered sanctions against the client and the 
attorney. The court of appeals remanded the sanctions 
against the attorney for a factual finding as to whether the 
attorney was actually to blame for the discovery violation. 
The court of appeals explained, "We believe that [a sanction] 
is unjust when it is imposed against a person who had 
absolutely no fault for the discovery violation at issue...." 
Id. at T{37 (footnotes omitted); see also M.E.N. Co. v. Control Fluidics, Inc., 834 F.2d 869 
(10th Cir. 1987) (reversing the district court's imposition of sanctions against the 
appellant clients who failed to provide discovery, violated a court order for failing to 
appear for noticed depositions, failed to file a pretrial trial memorandum, and pay 
monetary sanctions to other party because the clients' attorneys never notified them of 
the discovery obligations). 
III. The Trial Court's Imposition Of Sanctions Against The Welshes Without 
Evidentiary Support Violates Their Due Process Rights, 
The trial court's January 22 and April 14 Orders should be reversed outright as an 
abuse of discretion, for the reasons stated above. In addition, the January 22 and April 14 
Orders should be reversed because the trial court violated the Welshes' due process rights 
through its (a) sua sponte reversal of its December 29 Ruling, (b) sua sponte imposition 
of sanctions and (c) after-the-fact findings to support the sanctions. 
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Article I, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution provides, "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const. Art. I § 7. 
The 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States' Constitution contain nearly identical 
language. See U.S. Const, amend. V ("No person shal l . . . be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law . .. ."); U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.").6 
"Due process requires, at a minimum, adequate and timely notice." In re McCully, 942 
P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997). The Welshes were not given notice or an opportunity to 
respond before the trial court sua sponte reversed its December 29 Ruling and denied 
their fundamental rights to a fair trial. This in itself violates due process. 
The Welshes also were denied notice and an opportunity defend themselves 
against the allegations of misconduct and imposition of sanctions. "A judgment 
imposing sanctions under Rule 37 in violation of the offending parties' due process rights 
is void." SeeF.DJ.C. v. Daily, 973 F.2d 1525, 1531 (Tenth Cir. 1992). The Tenth 
Circuit has held that "due process requires notice and a right to respond before the 
As a general rule, "Utah's constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially 
the same as the due process guarantees contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments 
to the United States Constitution." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^ 11 n. 2, 52 P.3d 1158 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, this Court's "analysis of 
questions concerning procedural due process under the due process provisions of the 
United States and Utah constitutions are [sic] also substantially the same." Id 
(quotations and citations omitted). This general rule is likely applicable here because 
there appears to be no Utah law addressing the issue on appeal, and therefore the Welshes 
cite to federal law. But see Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 280 (Utah 
1997) (Stewart, J. dissenting) (observing, although due process was apparently not raised 
as an issue on appeal in that case, that "constitutional due process rights may be violated 
if a court refuses to hear the merits of the case where there has been a relatively trivial 
infraction of procedural rules."). 
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sanctions of costs, expenses, or attorney's fees are imposed." Id. "The process due 
depends upon the severity of the considered sanctions." Id.; cf Morton v. Continental 
Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 280 (Utah 1997) (Stewart, J. dissenting) (observing that 
"constitutional due process rights may be violated if a court refuses to hear the merits of 
the case where there has been a relatively trivial infraction of procedural rules."). While 
the "right to respond does not necessarily require an adversarial, evidentiary hearing," the 
sanction inquiry must be supported by the record. Daily, 973 F.2d at 1531 
As indicated, the trial court imposed severe sanctions against the Welshes sua 
sponte, without a hearing and without first making the requisite findings of intentional 
misconduct. Then, after the Welshes challenged the trial court's sua sponte sanctions 
based on this omission, the trial court made an after-the-fact finding of willfulness by 
implying it from the Welshes' failure to submit their expert disclosures by the 
December 1, 2008 deadline of the September 2O08 Scheduling Order and their failure to 
argue surprise or inadvertent conduct as an excuse. Implying willfulness as the trial court 
did is clearly not a ruling supported by the record. 
The trial court further violated the Welshes' due process rights by failing to 
provide the Welshes with an opportunity to rebut or answer for the conduct for which it 
imposed sanctions. Lakeview did not seek sanctions against the Welshes in its 
Opposition to the Motion for an Enlargement of Time. The trial court failed to make the 
requisite intentional misconduct finding before sua sponte imposing sanctions in the 
January 22 Order. Once apprised of this omission by the Welshes, rather than grant them 
a hearing to discuss the sanctions or issue an order to show cause, the trial court made a 
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finding of willfulness to try to support the sanctions. Thus, the Welshes were never given 
an opportunity to address the conduct for which they were sanctioned. As indicated, no 
evidence exists that would support a finding of willfulness, bad faith or other intentional 
misconduct by the Welshes. The sanctions therefore violate due process. 
Further, the trial court improperly inferred that missing the discovery deadline 
under the current Scheduling Order alone supports a finding of fault by the Welshes 
sufficient to support sanctions against the Welshes. The Tenth Circuit's opinion in 
Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987), is instructive. There, the court 
considered the due process protections that must be provided to an attorney prior to 
imposing sanctions against the attorney for filing an appeal deemed frivolous. Id. at 
1514-15. The court observed, "In one sense, notice may seem superfluous when an 
appellate court has determined, after considering briefs, argument and the record that the 
appeal is so unmeritorious as to be frivolous." Id. at 1514. 
But the determination to impose sanctions on an attorney for 
bringing a frivolous appeal involves another step—placing 
the blame. And there remains for consideration the defenses 
which might absolve the lawyer of the responsibility for 
taking the frivolous appeal. This, we hold, justifies and 
requires notice and opportunity to be heard before final 
judgment. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Here, the trial court made no inquiry and ordered no hearing or fact-finding 
procedure to determine whether the Welshes were personally to blame or whether they 
had any defenses that might absolve them of responsibility for the discovery violation. 
No such evidence exists. Instead, the trial court inferred willful misconduct by the 
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Welshes on April 14, 2009 from the single fact that the expert disclosures were not timely 
submitted under the September 2008 Scheduling Order notwithstanding the Welshes' 
counsel's filing of a motion to extend this deadline on November 26, 2008, and 
notwithstanding the trial court granting this motion on December 29, 2008. Based on this 
record, the trial court's imposition of sanctions against the Welshes violates due process 
and is void. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's January 22, 2009 Order and April 14, 
2009 Order must be reversed as erroneous, an abuse of discretion, a violation of due 
process, and then remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this IP day of September 2009 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
RdQney G. Snow/ 
Matthew A. Steward 
Aaron D. Lebenta 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners Wayne L. & 
Carol Welsh 
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WAYNE L. WELSH and 
CAROL WELSH, 
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vs. 
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH, 
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RULING ON MOTION FOR 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME AND 
DEFENDANT LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 060700106 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs motion for enlargement of time and the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding 
papers, along with their supporting documentation. Having considered all of the arguments, 
determined that a hearing is unnecessary for the Court's ruling, being fully advised in the 
premises, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the plaintiffs motion for 
enlargement of time and DENIES the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
On February 28, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant alleging 
negligence and loss of consortium. In their complaint, the plaintiffs' alleged to have provided the 
defendant with a notice of their intent to commence a medical malpractice action and to have 
complied with the statutory requirements concerning pre-litigation review of their medical 
malpractice claims. 
On April 13, 2006, the defendant answered the plaintiffs' complaint denying liability. 
Thereafter, on August 10, 2006, the Court issued a Rule 26(f) attorney planning meeting 
report and scheduling order for this litigation. This order was subsequently amended on May 25, 
2007, and again on February 12, 2008. 
On September 30, 2008, the Court held a telephone conference regarding a third amended 
scheduling order. During this telephone conference, the Court stressed that this matter had 
moved too slowly and that it would not permit further extensions of time or additional 
amendments beyond its third amended scheduling order. The Court then issued its third amended 
scheduling order, to which the parties had stipulated. Within this order, the Court wrote: "Last 
amended order, case to move along or it will be dismissed." The third amended scheduling order 
set the date for the plaintiffs' initial expert reports and disclosures as December 1, 2008. 
Subsequently, on November 26, 2008, the plaintiffs' filed a motion for enlargement of 
time and supporting affidavit of counsel.1 In his supporting affidavit, counsel for the plaintiffs 
acknowledged that the Court had been "very patient in the scheduling of this case" and indicated 
a commitment to moving this case forward. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' requested additional 
time to submit their initial expert reports and disclosures.2 
On December 5, 2008, and in response to the plaintiffs not submitting their initial expert 
reports and disclosures by the December 1, 2008 deadline, the defendant filed amotion for 
summary judgment and supporting memorandum. In its supporting memorandum, the defendant 
argued that because the plaintiffs had failed to timely submit any expert testimony pertaining to 
1
 On November 26, 2008, the plaintiffs also filed a motion to shorten the response time for the defendant's 
memorandum in opposition to their motion for enlargement of time. The Court granted this motion on December 10, 
2008, and the defendant subsequently timely served its opposing memorandum on the plaintiffs. 
2
 The plaintiffs7 motion purposed the Court change the December I, 2008 cutoff for submitting their initial expert 
reports and disclosures to January 9, 2009 
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the issue of the requisite standard of care, the plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie claim of 
medical malpractice. The defendant further asserted that it had not breached the stand of care for 
a hospital and thus summary judgment was appropriate, 
The defendant then, on December 15, 2008, filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time. In its memorandum, the defendant noted that the 
Court had made it clear during the September 30, 2008 telephone conference that it would not 
allow further amendments to the scheduling order. The defendant also asserted that there is no 
good faith basis for the plaintiffs to request additional time to complete discovery and designate 
expert witnesses, particularly in light of the Court's prior admonishment. 
On December 17, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in support of their 
motion for enlargement of time.3 In their reply, the plaintiffs again acknowledged the Court's 
need to move the case efficiently towards a resolution. The plaintiffs' then asserted that the delay 
in expert discovery was due to the defendant not cooperating with the plaintiffs' attempts to 
schedule certain employees of the defendant for deposition. Concurrent with their reply 
memorandum, the plaintiffs filed a request to submit for decision regarding their motion for 
enlargement of time. 
Additionally on December 17, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. In their memorandum, the plaintiffs asserted that 
their claim of negligence was not strictly a medical malpractice claim. The plaintiffs then argued 
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur creates an issue of material fact, which warrants the Court's 
denial of the defendant's motion even in the absence of expert testimony. The plaintiffs averred 
J
 The plaintiffs also on December 17, 2008, filed a designation of expert witnesses. This designation was not 
accompanied with the experts* reports and was filed over two (2) weeks late under the third amended scheduling 
oi dei 
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that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur establishes a prima facie case of negligence from the 
circumstances of a case based on the knowledge and experience of laypersons and thus expert 
testimony is unnecessary for the plaintiffs' claims 4 The plaintiffs also aigued that denial of the 
defendant's motion is warranted under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Piocedure, as the 
plaintiffs weie unable to present facts essential to theii opposition due to the defendant's lack of 
cooperation m ananging depositions with key witness 5 
Finally, on Decembei 24, 2008, the defendant filed a leply memorandum in support of its 
motion for summary judgment In its reply, the defendant aigued that the plaintiffs had not met 
the requirements of ray ipsa loquitur and cited several cases from jurisdictions outside of Utah 
that hold res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable in medical malpractice cases 6 
On January 2, 2009, the defendant filed a notice to submit for decision regarding its 
motion for summary judgment7 
ANALYSIS 
L The plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time. 
"
;A trial judge is given a great deal of latitude in deteimining the most fan and efficient 
manner to conduct court business " Morton v Continental Banking Co
 9 938 P 2d 271, 275 (Utah 
1997) The plaintiffs' instant motion requested the Court enlarge the time foi filing their initial 
4
 See Nixdoifv Hicken, 612 P 2d 348 352-54 (Utah 1980) Vugima S v Salt Lake Caie Cti , 741 P 2d 969, 972-73 
(Utah Ct App 1987), Baczuk v Salt Lake Regional Med Cti , 8 P 3d 1037, 1039-42 (Utah Ct App 2000) 
5
 In support of their Rule 56(f) argument, the plaintiffs filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit of counsel, which indicated the 
plaintiffs had made at least two (2) requests to depose certain employees of the defendant, but weie unable to take 
such depositions due to the defendant's failuie to produce the witnesses Notably, howevei, the Court has no lecoid 
of the plaintiffs attempting to subpoena these witness oi set a date foi then deposition 
6
 See Falchet v St LukesHosp Med Cti , 506 P 2d 287 (Anz Ct App 1973), Dollins v Hartfoid Acci & indem 
Co , 477 SW 2d 179 (Ark 1972), Taylor v Beaidstown, 491 NE 2d 803 (111 App Ct 1986), Tuggle v Hosp Auth 
Of Gwinnett Count), 211 SE 2d 167 (Ga Ct App 1974), Gi iggs v Mot ehead Mem I Hosp , 345 SE 2d 430 (N C 
Ct App 1986), MiUei v Delawaj e County Mem / Hosp , 239 A 2d 340 (Pa 1968) 
7
 Subsequently, on Januaiy 9, 2009, the plaintitfs submitted their expert leports to the defendant This submission 
was served on the defendant ovei one (1) month late under the timeline of the Couit's thud amended scheduling 
oidei 
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expert reports and disclosures. The plaintiffs have made this motion despite the Court's prior 
warnings that it would not permit additional extensions of time for discovery. Based on this 
litigation's slow progress over the past two (2) plus years and the Court's issuing four (4) 
scheduling orders, the Court expressly warned the parties that no additional extensions of time or 
amendments to its scheduling order would be permitted. The Court has granted the plaintiffs 
ample time to designate their expert witnesses and submit their expert reports and disclosures. 
Further, the plaintiffs have provided the Court with no persuasive good faith basis or justification 
for granting their motion for enlargement of time. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the plaintiffs' 
motion for enlargement of time. 
In addition to denying the plaintiffs' motion, the Court shall also impose sanctions 
against the plaintiffs. "Trial courts have broad discretion in selecting and imposing sanctions for 
discovery violations, including dismissing the noncompiiant party's pleadings." Tuck v. Godfrey, 
981 P.2d 407, 411 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (Internal quotations omitted); see also SFR, Inc. v. 
Comtrol, Inc., 177 P.3d 629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) ("the trial court has 'broad discretion' to 
select among the 'full range of options' in deciding which sanction to apply to the violator."). 
Here, the third amended scheduling order, which governs the timing of this litigation set a 
December 1, 2008 deadline for the plaintiffs to submit their initial expert reports and disclosures. 
The plaintiffs' failed to submit their initial expert reports and disclosures by this date and have 
provided the Court no adequate justification for their failure to comply with the Court's 
scheduling order. 
Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part: "If a party or a 
party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order ... the court, upon motion or its own 
Page 5 
initiative, may take any action authorized by Rule 37(b)(2).'" Due to the Court's prior 
admonishment of the parties for not timely moving this litigation forward and the Court's 
express warning that it would not permit further extensions of time or amendments to its 
scheduling order, the Court finds that sanctions are appropriate for the plaintiffs' failure to 
comply with discovery deadlines. 
Under Rule 37(b)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may "prohibit 
the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses or from 
introducing designated matters in evidence[.p In light of the circumstances of this case and the 
plaintiffs' failure to timely submit their initial expert reports and disclosures, the Court finds this 
an appropriate sanction to impose against the plaintiffs. The Court shall therefore prohibit the 
plaintiffs from introducing any expert testimony at trial regarding their claims. 
II. The defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P 56(c); 
See also Baczuk, 8 P.3d at 1039, Additionally, "[sjummary judgment should be granted with 
great caution in negligence cases." Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985). Due to the 
plaintiffs' failure to and timely submit their expert reports and disclosures, the defendant has 
moved the Court for summary judgment. 
The defendant has argued that absent expert testimony, the plaintiffs cannot establish the 
standard of care necessary to set forth a prima facie case of medical malpractice. However, 
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contrary to the defendant's assertion and as argued by the plaintiffs, Utah courts have recognized 
and applied the doctnne of res ipsa loquitur in cases of medical malpiactice 8 
"Typically [in medical malpractice cases], the standard of care and the defendant's 
breach of that standard must be established through expert testimony " Pete, 141 P 3d at 636 
However, Utah courts have long recognized an exception to this requirement Id Specifically, 
the Utah Supreme Court in Nixdorfv Hicken stated 
"expert testimony is unnecessary to estabhsh a standard of care owed the 
plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is within the 
common knowledge and experience of the layman " 612 P 2d at 352 
The Court in Nixdorf held that, [wjhen the appropriate evidentiary basis is presented a plaintiff 
may employ the doctnne of les ipsa loquitur to carry [the] buiden [of establishing the requisite 
standard of care] " Id 
The doctnne of res ipsa loquitui is an evidentiary doctnne that arises when the plaintiff 
can establish "(1) ^ie accident was of a kind which, m the ordinary couise of events, would not 
have happened had the defendant used due caie, (2) the instrument or thing causing the injury 
was at the time under the management and control of the defendant, and (3) the accident 
happened irrespective of any participation at the time by the plaintiff" Id at 352-353 
Here, the plaintiffs have alleged and argued that (1) Mr Welsh's fall from the exam 
table to the floor is not the type of event one would expect had he been propei ly supervised and 
stabilized by the defendant, (2) the defendant had contiol of the exam table and had custody of 
Mi Welsh while he was being examined and treated, and (3) while Mr Welsh may have been 
the one to faint oi lose control of his physical faculties, the defendant was aware of his 
*SeeNi\doijv Hicken, 612 P 2d 348, 352-54 (Utah 1980) VugmiaS v Salt Lake Cw e Cu , 741 P 2d 969, 972-73 
(Utah Ct App 1987) Baczuk \ Salt Lake Regional Med Q / 5 8 P 3d 1037, 1039-42 (Utah Ct App 2000), Pete v 
Youngblood, 141 P 3d 629 (Utah Ct App 2006) 
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vulnerable state, i.e. incapacitated in a similar way to one who is disabled or under anesthesia, 
and should have taken proper precautions to prevent his fall. 
Given nature of the accident being a fall after admission to an emergency room due to a 
fainting episode and head injury, and consistent with the plaintiffs' allegations and arguments, 
the Court finds that it is within the common knowledge and experience of a lay person to 
determine if the defendant breached its standard of care. Accordingly, the plaintiffs may employ 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this matter to establish that the defendant acted negligently. 
Thus, a material issue of fact does exist as to the plaintiffs' claims and summary judgment is not 
appropriate. The Court must therefore DENY the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court DENIES the plaintiffs motion for enlargement of time. Further, in light of the 
plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Court's scheduling order, and pursuant to Rules 16(d) and 
37(b)(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court shall prohibit the plaintiffs from 
introducing any expert testimony at trial regarding their claims. The Court also DENIES the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court directs the plaintiff to prepare and submit 
an order consistent with and reflecting this ruling. 
Date signed: f"2 % *£> 7 . 
ISTRICT CCftJRT JUDQ& 
MICHAEL G. A1XPHIN 
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This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs motion for relief from order and for 
entry of order enlarging time. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along 
with their supporting documentation. Having considered all of the arguments, determined that a 
hearing is unnecessary and will not aid in the Court's ruling, being fully advised in the premises, 
and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the plaintiffs motion for relief from order 
and for entry of order enlarging time. 
BACKGROUND 
On February 28, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant alleging 
negligence and loss of consortium. The defendant filed its answer on April 13,2006, denying 
liability. 
Thereafter, on August 10, 2006, the Court issued a Rule 26(f) attorney planning meeting 
report and scheduling order. This order was subsequently amended on May 25, 2007, and again 
on February 12, 2008. 
On September 30, 2008, the Court held a telephone conference regarding a third amended 
scheduling order. During this telephone conference, the Court stressed that this matter had 
progressed too slowly and that it would not permit further extensions of time or additional 
amendments beyond a third amended scheduling order. The Court then issued its third amended 
scheduling order, to which the parties had stipulated. Within this order, the Court wrote: "Last 
amended order, case to move along or it will be dismissed." The third amended scheduling order 
set the deadline for the plaintiffs' initial expert reports and disclosures as December 1, 2008. 
Subsequently, on November 26, 2008, the plaintiffs' filed a motion for enlargement of 
time and supporting affidavit of counsel. In his supporting affidavit, counsel for the plaintiffs 
acknowledged that the Court had been "very patient in the scheduling of this case" and indicated 
a commitment to moving this case forward. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs requested additional time 
to submit their initial expert reports and disclosures.1 
On December 5, 2008, and in response to the plaintiffs not submitting their initial expert 
reports and disclosures by the third amended scheduling order's December 1, 2008 deadline, the 
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.2 The defendant then, on December 15, 2008, 
filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time. In its 
memorandum, the defendant noted that the Court had made it clear during the September 30, 
1
 The plaintiffs5 motion purposed the Court change the December 1, 2008 cutoff for submitting their initial expert 
reports and disclosures to January 9, 2009. 
2
 By written ruling dated January 22, 2009, the Court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, 
indicating that the plaintiffs' claims would survive despite the Court's prohibiting the plaintiffs' use of belated 
expert discovery materials at trial. 
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2008 telephone conference that it would not allow further amendments to the scheduling order. 
The defendant also asserted that there is no good faith basis for the plaintiffs to request additional 
time to complete discovery and designate expert witnesses, particularly in light of the Court's 
prior admonishments. 
On December 17, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a reply memorandum in support of their 
motion for enlargement of time. In their reply, the plaintiffs again acknowledged the Court's 
need to move the case efficiently towards a resolution. Concurrent with their reply 
memorandum, the plaintiffs filed a request to submit for decision regarding their motion for 
enlargement of time. 
On December 29, 2008, and unaware of the Court's prior admonishment over the slow 
progress of this matter and the Court's warning within the third amended scheduling order that it 
would not permit further time extensions in this matter, the Court's clerk contacted the plaintiffs' 
counsel and indicated that a proposed order granting the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of 
time should be submitted. That same day, the Court's clerk also entered a note on the Court's 
docket stating: "Mr. Steward's Motion to Enlarge Time is granted, last time. He needs to submit 
an order. I called his office this date." The plaintiffs subsequently submitted their proposed order 
on January 15,2009. 
Meanwhile, the Court requested its law clerk review the Court's case file and pleadings 
regarding the parties' pending motions. Upon such review, the Court was apprised of its warning 
within the third amended scheduling order and prior admonishments, and determined that its 
3
 The plaintiffs also on December 17, 2008, filed a designation of expert witnesses. This designation was not 
accompanied with the experts' reports and was filed over two (2) weeks late under the third amended scheduling 
older. Subsequently, on January 9, 2009, the plaintiffs submitted then expert reports to the defendant. This 
submission was served on the defendant ovei one (1) month late under the deadlme for such expert discovery within 
the Court's third amended scheduling order. 
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prior admonishments and discovery order would stand. The Court then declined to execute the 
plaintiffs' proposed order and issued a written ruling, dated January 22, 2009 (herein, the 
"Ruling"), denying the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time and prohibiting the plaintiffs 
from using the belated expert discovery materials at trial. 
In response to the Court's Ruling, the plaintiffs filed the instant motion for relief from 
order and for entry of order enlarging time. In their supporting memorandum filed concurrently 
therewith, the plaintiffs argued that their reliance on the Court's clerk's request for submission of 
a proposed order and the Court docket's note of December 29. 2008, justify relief from the 
Court's Ruling. The plaintiffs asserted that because they believed that the motion for 
enlargement of time was granted, considerable time and money was expended to produce their 
expert discovery. The plaintiffs further argued that the imposed sanction preventing the 
plaintiffs' use of expert testimony is unwarranted and extreme, despite the Court's prior 
discovery order, which stated dismissal would occur if the case did not progress. 
On February 12, 2009, the defendant served its memorandum in opposition to the 
plaintiffs' instant motion for relief from order. In its opposing memorandum, the defendant 
argued that the Court's Ruling was within the Court's authority and justified under the 
circumstances of this case. The defendant asserted that the plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the 
Court's clerk's statements or the docket note of December 29, 2008, as the filing of the 
plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time did not relieve the plaintiffs of their duty under the 
Court's third amended scheduling order to serve expert designations and reports on December 1, 
2008. The defendant argued that because the plaintiffs provided no compelling reason why the 
deadline for expert discovery within the third amended scheduling order should be ignored, the 
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Court's Ruling was appropriate Further, the defendant posited that since the plaintiffs were well 
aware of the December 1, 2008 expert discovery deadline and the Court's prior admonishments 
foi the slow progression of this matter, the imposed sanction was appropriate Accordingly, the 
defendant submitted that the plaintiffs failed to establish a good faith basis for the Court to 
amend or set aside its Ruling 
On February 23, 2009, the plaintiffs filed their reply memorandum in support of their 
instant motion for relief from older In their reply, the plaintiffs reasserted their prior arguments 
regarding their reliance on the December 29, 2008 statements of the Court's clerk and docket 
note and that the imposed sanction is an undue prejudice to their claims The plaintiffs further 
argued that because their failure to comply with the December 1, 2008 expert discovery deadline 
was not mtentional or willful, the Court could not impose a sanction to exclude their use of 
expert testimony at trial. 
Also on February 23, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a request to submit for decision regarding 
their motion for relief from order and requested oral argument on the same 4 
ANALYSIS 
The plaintiffs have requested relief from the Court's Ruling pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) provides in relevant part 
"[A]ny order or othei form of decision, however designated, that 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties is subject to revision at any time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties " 
4
 The Court has reviewed the parties' pleadings and supporting materials, along with the Court's file The Court 
finds that it is fully aware of the parties' arguments and the circumstances relevant to the plaintiffs' instant motion 
The Court further fmds that a hearing on the plaintiffs' instant motion for relief from order will not aid in its ruling 
on the same The Court therefore DENIES the plaintiffs' request for oral argument Accordingly, the plaintiffs' 
motion foi relief from order and entiy of oidei enlaigmg time is ripe foi decision 
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Utah R Civ P 54(b) Further, Rule 60(b) provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as aie 
just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding" for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment" Utah R Civ P 60(b)(7) The grant or denial of relief requested under these Rules 
of Civil Procedure is left to the sound discretion of the trial court See Trembly v Mrs Fields 
Cookies, 884 P 2d 1306, 1312 (Utah Ct App 1994) ("It is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court to grant a motion under Rule 54(b), and the decision to do so will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent an abuse of this discretion "), Facfa'ell v Fackrell, 740 P 2d 1318, 1320 (Utah 
1987) ("In reviewing a trial court's decision under Rule 60(b), we disturb the trial court only if it 
has abused its discretion ") Further, "[a] trial judge is given a great deal of latitude m 
determining the most fair and efficient mannei to conduct court business " Morton v Continental 
Banking Co , 938 P 2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997)5 
The plaintiffs' instant motion pertains to their motion foi enlargement of time for filing 
initial expert reports and disclosures The plaintiffs made this motion despite the Court's prior 
warnings that it would not permit additional extensions of time for discovery Based on this 
litigation's slow progress over the past three (3) plus years and the Court's issuing four (4) 
scheduling orders, the Court found that it had granted the plaintiffs ample time to designate their 
expert witnesses and submit then expert reports and disclosures by the December 1, 2008 
deadline within the third amended scheduling order Further, the Court found that the plaintiffs 
provided no persuasive good faith basis or justification for granting their motion for enlargement 
5
 Particulaily noteworthy m the instant mattei, "[t]nal courts have broad discretion in selecting and imposing 
sanctions foi discover) violations, including dismissing the noncomphant party's pleadings " Tuckv Godfrey, 981 
P 2d 407, 411 (Utah Ct App 1999) (Internal quotations omitted), see also SFR Inc ^ Comtrol Inc , 177 P 3d 629? 
633 (Utah Ct App 2008) ("the trial court has 'broad discretion' to select among the 'full range of options' in 
deciding which sanction to apply to the violatoi ") "[Although some of Rule 37's discovery sanctions are haish and 
extieme, Rule 37 grants the tiial couit broad discietion to impose them because the trial court deals first hand with 
the parties and the discovery process " Wi ight v Wi ight, 941 P 2d 646, 650 (Utah Ct App 1997) 
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of time. Accordingly, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time. In 
addition, because the plaintiffs failed to comply with the deadlines of the third amended 
scheduling order, the Court imposed sanctions against the plaintiffs pursuant to Rules 16(d) and 
37(b)(2)(B). Specifically, the Court's Ruling prohibited the plaintiffs from introducing any 
expert testimony at trial regarding their claims. 
The plaintiffs now seek relief from this Ruling due to their alleged reliance on the Court's 
clerk requesting submission of a proposed order and the docket note of December 29, 2008. 
While the plaintiffs characterize both incidents as the Court issuing its "ruling" on the motion for 
enlargement of time, the Court neither entered a minute entry, made an oral ruling or order on 
the record, nor prepared or executed a ruling or order to that effect. Quite simply, no ruling was 
issued on the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time until the Court issued its written Ruling 
of January 22, 2009. 
A note within the Court's docket does not constitute a ruling or order of the Court. The 
primary purpose of a note within the docket is to aid in the administration of the Court's case 
file. Court clerks will enter notes on the docket for several reasons, which could include: when a 
submitted document is received; indication of where submitted documents are sent and to whom; 
attempts of Clerks to contact counsel; or whether counsel has attempted to contact the Court. 
Notes on the Court's docket are not binding determinations of the Court and the plaintiffs' 
reliance on of the December 29, 2008 docket note in this matter is misplaced. 
Further, while the Court's clerk may have informed the plaintiffs that the Court would 
grant their motion and to submit a proposed order reflecting the same, the Court was free to 
reject the proposed order and issue a written ruling on the plaintiffs' motion, even if the 
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December 29, 2008 docket note and clerk's statements could be considered the Court's ruling. 
"It is well established that a court may vacate, set aside, or modify its orders or judgments 
entered by mistake or inadvertence which do not accurately reflect the result of its judgment." 
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (Internal quotation omitted). 
"When a trial judge signs an order prepared by counsel, mistakenly or inadvertently assuming 
that it correctly reflects the court's judgment, the mistake is of a clerical or perfunctory nature, 
which the court may correct on its own motion" Id. (citing Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 299 P.2d 
827 (Utah 1956); UtahR. Civ. P. 60(a)) (Emphasis added). 
Additionally, the Court finds the plaintiffs' argument that they were prejudiced by the 
December 29, 2008 statements of the Court's clerk unpersuasive and without merit. As correctly 
noted by the defendant, the plaintiffs mere filing of a motion for enlargement of time did not 
relieve the plaintiffs of their duty under the third amended scheduling order to serve expert 
designations and reports on December 1, 2008. Any statements made by the Court's clerk were 
made twenty-nine (29) days after the plaintiffs' failed to comply with the expert discovery 
deadline. On December 1, 2008, rather than making some filing in regard to their expert 
designations and reports, the plaintiffs instead made the assumption that the Court would grant 
its motion and acted accordingly. The Court finds this assumption unjustified, particularly in 
light of the Court's prior admonishments and express warning within the third amended 
scheduling order that no further extensions of time would be permitted. 
Finally, with regard to the sanction imposed by the Court for the plaintiffs' failure to 
comply with the third amended scheduling order, the Court again finds the plaintiffs' arguments 
unpersuasive and without merit. Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the 
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Court clear authority to impose "any action authorized by rule 37(b)(2)" as a sanction for failing 
to "obey a scheduling or pretrial order[.]" Utah R. Civ. P 16(d). Rule 37(b)(2)(B) provides that 
the Court may "prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or 
defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence" as such a sanction. Utah R. Civ P. 
37(b)(2)(B). This is precisely the sanction imposed by the Court in this matter. 
Further, Utah courts have, on numerous occasions, affirmed a trial court's decision to 
exclude testimony from witnesses designated untimely. See Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255, 
261 (Utah 1999) ("The order refusing to permit the witness to testify is such an order [under 
Rule 16(d)] and is a reasonable response to the failure to comply with the court's managerial 
plan."); Arnold v Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1993) ("Sanctions often are imposed when 
parties fail to obey pretrial order requiring the attorney to file statements, witness lists, or lists of 
evidence. In those situations, evidence has been excluded; defenses have been stricken."); 
Rukavina v. Sprague, 170 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Utah Ct App. 2007) ("If a party fails to obey a 
scheduling order, the trial court may prohibit him from introducing designated matters in 
evidence.").6 
Moreover, Rule 37 sanctions require a finding of "(1) the party's behavior was willful; 
(2) the party has acted in bad faith; (3) the court can attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the 
party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial process." Morton 
6
 Utah courts have even dismissed a party's claims in their entirety foi failing to comply with discovery orders See 
Morton v Continental Banking Co , 938 P 2d 271, 276 (Utah 1997) ("In any event, all of these cases clearly stand 
foi the proposition that trial courts aie granted a gieat deal of defeience m dismissing a case as a discoveiy 
sanction "), Preston & Chambers, PC v Roller, 943 P 2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct App 1997) ("Therefore, because the 
trial court issued an order imposing a discoveiy deadline, which Kollei failed to meet, the decision to sanction 
Koller by dismissing his counterclaims is within the court's discretion "), tee also Arnica Mut Ins Co v Schettler, 
768 P 2d 950, 962 (Utah Ct. App 1989) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion m entering Schettler's default 
for his failure to comply with the court's discovery order") Therefore, m light of the Court's warning that dismissal 
would occur if the case did not progress, the Court finds that the imposed sanction on the plaintiffs is not unduly 
piejudicial or overly extreme 
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v. Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah 1997). However, "[t]o find that a party's 
behavior has been willful, there need only be any intentional failure, as distinguished from 
involuntary noncompliance." Id.; see also Tuck, 981 P.2d at 411 ("To support a finding of 
willfulness, there need only be any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary 
noncompliance. No wrongful intent need be shown."). 
The instant matter is analogous to that of DeBr)> v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353 (Utah 
1994). In DeBry, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court decision to exclude the Debrys' 
use of expert testimony for failing to comply with the court's discovery order. Id. at 1361. In 
reaching this decision the DeBry Court noted: 
"In sum, the DeBrys had ample notice of the deadline. Not only did they 
miss that deadline, but they waited until after the discovery cut-off date to 
designate witnesses. They assert no surprise, no unforeseen circumstances, 
or any other legitimate excuse for their default. They simply seem to 
assume that the trial judge had some duty to allow them to violate the 
discovery orders for any or no reason. Under the circumstances, the trial 
judge was certainly not beyond the bounds of his discretion." 
Id. Likewise, in the instant matter, the plaintiffs were well aware of the expert discovery 
deadlines within the Court's third amended scheduling order and of the Court's prior 
admonishments regarding the slow progress of the case. The plaintiffs also have asserted neither 
surprise, unforeseen circumstances, nor any other legitimate excuse for their default. 
Accordingly, and particularly in light of the Court's prior admonishments, the Court finds that at 
a minimum, the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the discovery order was willful in that the 
plaintiffs' failure to comply was not due to involuntary noncompliance. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the its original Ruling of January 22, 2009 properly 
denied the plaintiffs' motion for enlargement of time and that the imposed sanction was 
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appropriate under the circumstances of this case. The Court further finds that the plaintiffs have 
not met their burden under Rule 54(b) or Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
obtain relief from the Court's Ruling. The Court therefore DENIES the plaintiffs' motion for 
relief from order and for entry of order enlarging time. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court DENIES the plaintiffs motion for relief from order and for entry of order 
enlarging time. This mling shall also constitute the Court's order in this matter; no separate order 
is necessary. 
Date signed:_ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDCfrE 
MICHAEL G>ALLPHI 
/ & / Sfc 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER AND FOR ENTRY OF ORDER ENLARGING TIME 
postage pre-paid, to the following on this date: 
Eric P. Schoonveld 
Mark A. Riekhof 
Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 2450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Rodney G. Snow 
Matthew A. Steward 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2216 
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2nd District - Farmington 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE L WELSH vs. HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH 
:ASE NUMBER 060700106 Malpractice 
5 
(CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
O MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
HARTIES 
£ Plaintiff - WAYNE L WELSH 
Ijj, Represented by: RODNEY G SNOW 
Represented by: MATTHEW A STEWARD 
Plaintiff - CAROL WELSH 
Represented by: RODNEY G SNOW 
Represented by: NATHAN B WILCOX 
Represented by: MATTHEW A STEWARD 
Defendant - HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH 
Doing Business As - LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL 
Represented by: STEPHEN D ALDERMAN 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT • 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
235.00 
235.00 
0.00 
0.00 
- NO AMT S 
155.00 
155.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: JURY DEMAND - CIVIL 
Amount Due: 7 5.00 
Amount Paid: 7 5.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: TELEPHONE/FAX CHARGE 
Amount: Due: 5.00 
Amount Paid: 5.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
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CASE NUMBER 060700106 M a l p r a c t i c e 
B a l a n c e : 0 .00 
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^PROCEEDINGS 
63 
' ^2-28-06 Case f i l e d 
$p2-28-0 6 Judge MICHAEL G ALLPHIN assigned. 
"02-28-06 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
flj)2-28-06 Filed: Demand Civil Jury 
($2-28-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
"62-28-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 75.00 
{&2-28-06 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 155.00 
% Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S, JURY DEMAND 
Jj - CIVIL, Mail Payment; 
|2-28-06 JURY DEMAND - CIVIL Payment Received: 75.00 
03-16-06 Filed return: Proof of Service/Summons and Complaint (Jury 
Demanded) 
Party Served: HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: March 07, 2006 
03-16-06 Filed return: Proof of Service/Summons and Complaitn (Jury 
Demanded) 
Party Served: LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: March 07, 2006 
04-13-06 Filed: Defendant's answer to complaint 
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH 
06-08-06 Filed: Certificate of Service Defendant Hospital Corporation of 
Utah, d/b/a Lakeview Hospital's Initial Rule 26(a)(1) 
Disclosures 
07-19-06 Filed: Certificate of Service 
07-27-06 Note: Rule 26(f) Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report and 
(Proposed) Scheduling Order to MGA 
08-10-06 Filed order: Rule 26(f) Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report and 
(Proposed) Scheduling Order 
Judge MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
Signed August 04, 2006 
02-22-07 Filed: Request for Rule 16 Scheduling Conference 
02-27-07 TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONF. scheduled on April 26, 2007 at 08:30 
AM in Courtroom 5 with Judge ALLPHIN. 
04-12-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 060700106 ID 10043397 
TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONF. is scheduled. 
Date: 04/26/2007 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom 5 
Judicial Complex 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, UT 8 4 025 
Before Judge: MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
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CASE NUMBER 060700106 Malpractice 
H04-24-07 TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONF. Cancelled. 
JJ| Reason: Rescheduled. 
| 04-25-07 TELEPHONE CONFERNECE scheduled on May 04, 2007 at 08:45 AM m 
* Courtroom 5 with Judge ALLPHIN. 
Jj; 05-04-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
Judge: MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
$ Clerk: tens 
i 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff!s Attorney(s): NATHAN B WILCOX 
Defendant's Attorney (s) : MARK A RIEKHOF 
Video 
HEARING 
The parties advise that they have drafted an Amended Scheduling 
Order which they will submit for review and signature of the Court. 
05-25-07 Filed: Amended Rule 26(f) Attorneys Planning Meeting Report and 
[Proposed} Amended Scheduling Order 
08-03-07 Filed: Certificate of Service Defendant Lakeview Hospital's 
First Set Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents to Plaintiffs 
01-28-08 Note: Rule 26(F) Amended Scheduling Order to MGA on February 6, 
2008 
01-28-08 Note: Rule 26(F) Amended Scheduling Order to MGA on February 6, 
2008 
02-12-08 Filed order: Rule 26(f) amended scheduling order 
Judge MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
Signed February 11, 2008 
06-20-08 Filed: Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel 
08-28-08 Note: Stipulated Scheduling Order to MGA 
09-09-08 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on September 30, 2008 at 08:45 
AM in Courtroom 5 with Judge ALLPHIN. 
09-09-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 060700106 ID 10311873 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 09/30/2008 
Time: 08:45 a.m. 
Location. Courtroom 5 
Judicial Complex 
800 West State Street 
Farmmgton, UT 84025 
Before Judge: MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
09-09-08 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on September 30, 2008 at 08:45 
AM in Courtroom 5 with Judge ALLPHIN. 
09-10-08 Note: Scheduling Order denied - telephone conference set. 
09-10-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 060700106 ID 10312276 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Printed: 04/20/09 11:40.04 Page 3 
CASE NUMBER 060700106 Malpractice 0 0 0 4 4 0 
Date. 09/30/2008 
Time: 08:45 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom 5 
M Judicial Complex 
H 800 West State Street 
| Farmington, UT 84025 
c
 Before Judge: MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
£ 09-10-08 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Cancelled. 
4*09-30-08 Filed order: Stipulated Rule 26(F) Amended Scheduling Order 
w Judge MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
• Signed September 30, 2008 
09-30-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
| Judge: MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
N Clerk: karensd 
tt TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
J3j PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): NATHAN B WILCOX 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARK A RIEKHOF 
Video 
HEARING 
The Court has received a third amended scheduling order. The 
Court is ready to dismiss the case because nothing is being filed 
to move the case forward. Requests for discovery was filed m 
August 2007. 
Mr. Wilcox states that he has asked for depositions of Defendants 
and he believes time is being wasted . He wants to move the case 
along. He feels the case has merit and he intends to pursue it. 
He will provide responses to discovery requests today. 
But opposing counsel has filed to motion to compel. 
Mr. Riekhof states that they have had many discussions but nothing 
happens in a time line. There have been no dates set for 
depositions. 
The Court states that the case is 2 1/2 years old and we have 
received the 4th scheduling order. The Court will dismiss this 
case if it doesn't start moving forward. If the Court doesn't see 
some action, it will notice the case for Pretrial and 
determine what has been done and if it isn't moving forward, the 
Court will dismiss the action. If the Court needs to intervene on 
discovery, then motions need to be filed. 
10-16-08 Filed: Second Amended Notice of Deposition of Plaintiffs Wayne 
L. Welsh and Carol Welsh 
11-26-08 Filed: Notice of Entry of Appearance - Rodney G. Snow & Matthew 
A. Steward for Wayne & Carol Welsh 
11-26-08 Filed: Motion for Enlargement of Time 
Filed by: STEWARD, MATTHEW A 
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11-26-08 Filed: Affidavit of Matthew A. Steward 
11-2 6-08 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Order Shortening Response Time 
Filed by: STEWARD, MATTHEW A 
11-26-08 Note: Order Sortening Response Time to MGA on 12/8/08 
^12-05-08 Filed: Defendant Lakeview Hospital's Motion for Summary 
p Judgment 
tl2-15-08 Filed: Defendant Lakeview Hospital's Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Enlargement of Time 
$12-16-08 Filed order: Order Shortening Response Time 
j* Judge MICHAEL G ALLPHIN 
* Signed December 10, 2008 
5J.2-17-08 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
^ Enlargement of Time 
JL2-17-08 Filed: Plaintiffs' Designation of Expert Witnesses 
&L2-17-08 Filed: Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
jp Judgment 
&2-17-08 Filed: Rule 56(f) Affidavit of Counsel for Plaintiffs 
12-17-08 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision on Motion to Enlarge Time 
12-24-08 Filed: Defendant's Lakeview Hospitals Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
12-29-08 Note: Mr. Steward's Motion to Enlarge Time is granted, last 
time. He needs to submit an order. I called his office this 
date. 
01-02-09 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for Hearing 
01-15-09 Filed: UNSIGNED Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Enlargement of 
Time 
01-15-09 Note: Order on Plainitiffs' Motion to MGA 
01-16-09 Filed: Certificate of Service of Expert Reports2 
01-22-09 Filed: Ruling on Motion for Enlargement of Time and Defendant 
Lakeview Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment 
01-23-09 Note: FF & DD to MGA 
01-30-09 Filed: Motion for relief from order and for entry of order 
enlarging time 
Filed by: SNOW, RODNEY G 
01-30-09 Filed: Memorandum in support of motion for relief from order 
and for entry of order enlarging time 
01-30-09 Filed: Ex-Parte motion for order shortening response time 
01-30-09 Note: Order shortening response time to MGA 2/10 
01-30-09 Filed: UNSIGNED Order Shortening Response Time 
02-02-09 Filed: Certificate of service 
02-12-09 Filed: Notice of deposition of Allen Kunnard 
02-17-09 Filed: Defendant Lakeview Hospital's Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motino for Reflief from Order and for Entry of Order Enlarging 
Time 
02-17-09 Note: **OBJECTION FILED** 
02-23-09 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Relief from 
Order and for Entry of Order Enlarging Time 
02-23-09 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision on Motion for Relief From 
Order and for Entry of Order Enlarging Time (Oral Argument 
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Requested) 
04-14-09 Filed: Ruling on Motion for Relief from Order and for Entry of 
Order Enlarging Time 
04-15-09 Fee Account created Total Due: 5.00 
04-15-09 TELEPHONE/FAX CHARGE Payment Received: 5.00 
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LAW OFFICES 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 700 CHASE TOWER 
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY 50 WEST BROADWAY 
SCOTT A. CALL SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 -2035 
JCgiN P. MULLEN 
JOfN V. HARPER 
N$f*HAN B. WILCOX 
ST|PHEN P. HORVAT 
JENNIFER R. ESHELMAN 
HITHER M. SNEDDON 
j q $ N A. BLUTH JOHN T. ANDERSON 
\h FRANCIS |. CARNEY 
PIERO RUFFINENGO 
Of Counsel 
TELEPHONE (801) -5^4-1700 
FACSIMILE (801) 364-7697 
www.aklawfirm.com 
May 4,2007 
Mark A. Riekhof 
Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 2450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Welsh v. Lakeview Hospital 
Dear Mark: 
It was good to talk with you again this morning. I have prepared the enclosed proposed 
attorneys' report and amended order ("proposed order") for your review and consideration. I 
tried to email it to you at the email address that you provided, but it was returned to me as 
undeliverable. If you could send me a test email (nwilcox@aklawfirm.com), I can then respond 
to that email with a copy of the proposed order. 
I modified the proposed order with respect to the expert dates so that you would have an 
additional month that you indicated you would need during our telephone conference with the 
Court. I set the dates based upon the default time periods under the Rule, but I would prefer 
shortening all of the dates. 
Please review the enclosed proposed order and give me a call as soon as possible so that 
we can discuss it. As soon as we have an agreement, I will send the proposed order to you via 
U.S. mail and email so that it can be executed and filed with the Court for consideration. 
I would like to schedule depositions in this matter as soon as possible. I would like to 
depose the following: 
(1) Dr. Robert Keddington; 
(2) the nurse who transported Wayne to the nuclear medicine lab and then received 
him when he returned. I cannot identify her name from medical records, but 
believe it is "S. Gee"; 
(3) Allen Kunard-imaging and cardio tech; 
000355 
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Mark A. Riekhof 
May 4, 2007 
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| (4) Dr. Eric Anding; 
w (5) the supervisor or head nurse for the nuclear medicine lab; 
(6) Elayne M. Shutt; and 
(7) any other medical personnel who were present during any of the testing for 
Wayne. 
\ I understand that you do not represent Dr. Keddington. I will contact his counsel to set 
up a deposition. If you do not represent Dr. Anding, please let me know and I will contact him 
tlirough his office to arrange for a deposition. In addition, please let me know if you will be 
representing the others whom I have identified and when they would be available for deposition. 
Yours very truly, 
Nathan B. Wilcox 
NBW/sd 
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LAW OFFICES 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORA1ION 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 700 CHASE TOWER 
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY 50 WEST BROADWAY 
SCOTT A. CALL SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-2035 
jdfiN P. MULLEN 
JON V. HARPER TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700 
N/fjfHAN B. WILCOX 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
JENIFER R, ESHELMAN 
HEATHER M. SNEDDON 
FACSIMILE (801V364-7697 
w ww.ak!awfirm .com 
JOJj^ N A. BLUTH JOHN T. ANDERSON 
JESSM. HOFBERGER FRANCIS J. CARNEY 
™ P1ERO RUFFINENGO 
g July 10,2007 ofCounsel 
s 
Mark A. Riekhof 
Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 2450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RE: Welsh v. Lakeview Hospital 
Dear Mark: 
This letter is a follow up to my letter to you dated May 4, 2007, wherein I indicated that I 
would like to schedule the depositions of the following: 
(1) Dr. Robert Keddington; 
(2) the nurse who transported Wayne to the nuclear medicine lab and then received 
him when he returned. I cannot identify her name from medical records, but 
believe it is "S. Gee"; 
(3) Allen Kunard-imaging and cardio tech; 
(4) Dr. Eric Anding; 
(5) the supervisor or head nurse for the nuclear medicine lab; 
(6) Elayne M. Shutt; and 
(7) any other medical personnel who were present during any of the testing for 
Wayne. 
I would like to notice up these depositions as soon as possible. Please let me know when 
these individuals are available for depositions. For your information, I am available July 23, 25 
(p.m.), 31 (p.m.) and August 1, 6 (a.m.), 7 (a.m.), 10, 13-19, 20-24. Please let me know as soon 
as possible which dates will work for you and your clients. If I do not hear from you on or 
before July 19, 2007, I will notice up the depositions of the individuals identified above 
providing you with at least two weeks notice. 
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As for the depositions of my clients, please let me know when you would like to take 
those depositions and I can make them available. It is my goal to have these depositions all 
completed before the end' of August so that we may move this matter forward. 
NBW/sd 
Enclosure 
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ERIC P SCHOONVELD #10900 
MARK A RIEKHOF#8420 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 2450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 801-320-0900 
Facsimile 801-320-0896 
Attorneys for Hospital Corporation of Utah d/b/a Lakevzew Hospital 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE L WELSH and 
CAROL WELSH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH, 
d/b/a LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, 
Defendant 
STIPULATED RULE 26(F) AMENDED 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
CASE NO 060700106 
Judge Michael G Allthin 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), Nathan B Wilcox of Clyde Snow Sessions & 
Swenson, attorney for Wayne L Welsh and Carol Welsh, and Gerald W Huston of Hall Prangle & 
Schoonveld, LLC, attorney for Defendant, discussed this case and agreed upon this Amended 
Scheduling Order 
1 INITIAL DISCLOSURE: The parties have already exchanged the initial 
information required by Rule 26(a)(1) 
i^ + A RHIP 26(R Amended Scheduling Order 
VD24555027 pages 6 
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2. DISCOVERY PLAN: The parties jointly propose to the court the following 
discovery plan: 
a. Discovery is necessary on all claims and defenses set forth in the parties' 
pleadings. 
b. Fact discovery will be completed no later than Friday, October 31, 2008. 
All written discovery shall be served so as to conform with this deadline. 
c. The parties agree that the following discovery methods may be used, with 
responses due within thirty (30) days of the date of service plus additional 
time for service by mail as provided by Rule 6(b); 
(1) Interrogatories, not to exceed 25; 
(2) Requests for Production of Documents; 
(3) Requests for Admissions; and 
(4) Depositions, not to exceed ten (10) per party and 
one (1) day of seven (7) hours in length per 
deposition. 
d. Plaintiffs' Initial Expert Disclosures and Reports under Rule 26(a)(3) shall be 
served no later than Monday, December 1, 2008. 
e. Plaintiffs' Expert Witnesses shall be deposed by Friday, January 2, 2009. 
f. Defendant's Initial Expert Disclosures and Reports under Rule 26(a)(3) shall 
be served no later than Friday, January 30, 2009. 
2 000062 
g. Defendant's Expert Witnesses shall be deposed by Friday, February 27, 
2009. 
h. Rebuttal Reports under Rule 26(e)(1) shall be served no later than Friday, 
March 27, 2009. 
l. Expert discovery will be completed no later than Friday, April 24, 2009. 
j . Supplementations are due as parties discover information or documents 
requiring supplementation. 
3. OTHER ITEMS: 
a. The parties do not request a conference with the court prior to entry of the 
scheduling order. 
b. The parties request a final pretrial conference in April 2009. 
c. The deadline for filing a motion to amend pleadings shall be Friday, 
November 14, 2008. 
d. The deadline for serving dispositive or potential dispositive motions shall be 
Friday, May 11, 2009. 
e. The potential for setdement cannot be determined at this time. 
f. The potential for resolution of this matter through the court's alternative 
dispute resolution program cannot be determined at this time. 
g. The deadline for holding an initial mediation or other formal setdement 
conference or, in the alternative, determining such an alternative dispute 
3 
000063 
resolution process is not likely to be of assistance is Friday, October 17, 
2008. 
h. Final lists of witnesses and exhibits pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(3) shall be 
served at least thirty (30) days before trial, 
l. The parties should have fourteen (14) days after service of final lists of 
witnesses and exhibits to list ob)ections under Rule 26(a)(3). 
j . This case should be certified for trial by June 2009. 
k. The estimated length of the trial is 5 days. A jury has been demanded. 
DATED this 2J) -^ day of August, 2008. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
DATED this Z-£> ~ day of August, 2008 
Nath/n B. Wilcox / ^ 
Attorneys for Wayne L. Welsh and Carol Welsh 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
Stephen Alderman 
Attorneys for Lakettew Hospital 
4 000064 
ORDER 
The foregoing schedule is hereby adopted and implemented as the governing schedule in 
this case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED this 
• . ^ ^ 
Judge Michael 
Third District Court J 
5 000065 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATED RULE 26(F) 
AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this day of August, 
5 2008 to the following: 
Nathan B. Wilcox 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center 
201 S. Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
Jennifer R. Eshelman 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2006 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
\^yjjorL^itti^) 
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ClydeSnow 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS 8c SWENSON 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
O N E UTAH CENTER • THIRTEENTH F L O O R 
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84 1 11 -2216 
TEL (801) 3 2 2 - 2 5 1 6 • FAX (801) 6 2 1 - 6 2 8 0 
www clydesnow com 
i Mark A. Riekhof, Esq. |j)j Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC 
J? 136 E. South Temple, Suite 2450 
** Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
MATTHEW A. STEWARD 
(801) 322-2516 
mas@clydesnow.com 
November 20, 2008 
RE: Welsh v. Lakeview Hopsital 
Case No. 060700106 
Dear Mark: 
Pursuant to our phone conference of last week, enclosed please find the documents you 
requested which are Bates Stamped WW000001-00G110. We still have not received any 
response to our request to take the depositions of the individuals of the hospital staff involved in 
the Welsh incident including the following: 
1. Alan Kunnard (RT); 
2. The nurse who transported Mr. Welsh to the Nuclear Medicine Lab and then 
received Mr. Welsh when he returned. The medical records are not clear who this individual is 
but it may be "S. Gee;" 
3. The supervisor ftjr the Nuclear Medicine Lab; 
4. Elayne M. Shutt; and 
5. Any other personnel who were present during the administration of the Persantine 
Stress Test. 
I know Mr. Wilcox has contacted you at least twice regarding these depositions and has 
not received a response other than your agreement that these depositions may be taken after the 
discovery deadline of the current scheduling order. 
You and I further discussed rearranging some of the dates of the Scheduling Order 
including the expert report deadlines to accommodate the remaining discovery. We should 
absolutely be able to accomplish this without moving the deadline for serving dispositive or 
potentially dispositive motions of May 11,2009 or the certification of trial date of June 2009. 
{00001895} 
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
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Mark A. Riekhof, Esq. 
November 20, 2008 
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Please let me hear from you regarding the foregoing at your very earliest convenience. 
Sincerely, 
Enclosures 
cc: Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq. 
Rodney G. Snow, Esq. 
Matthew A. Steward 
{00001895} 
000362 
TabH 
Rodney G. Snow (#3028) 
Matthew A. Steward (#7637) 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone (801) 322-2516 
Facsimile (801) 521-6280 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE L. WELSH and CAROL WELSH, 
Plaintiffs, 
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH 
d/b/a LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
Case No. 060700106 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Enlargement of Time was filed on or about November 26,2008. 
The matter was fully briefed and submitted for decision on December 17,2008. Neither party 
requested oral argument. Based upon Plaintiffs' Motion and for good cause appearing, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That the Plaintiffs' initial expert reports and disclosures shall be provided to 
Defendant's counsel on or before Friday, January 9, 2009; 
2. That the Defendant's initial expert reports and disclosures shall be provided to 
Plaintiffs' counsel on or before February 13, 2009; 
{00037314-1} 000237 
3. That the Plaintiffs' rebuttal expert reports, if any, shall be provided to Defendant's 
counsel on or before March 27, 2009; 
4. That the completion of expert discovery date shall remain Friday, April 24, 2009; 
and 
5. That the certification of readiness for trial date shall remain June 29, 2009. 
DATED this day of _ 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
Michael G. Allphin 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
A 
Mark A. Riekhof 
{00037314-1} 2 000238 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. I hereby certify that on the day of December 2008, a copy of the foregoing 
8 ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME was sent via 
» 
& hand-delivery to the following: 
\ 
\ Eric P. Schoonveld 
Mark A. Riekhof 
Hall Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC 
136 E. South Temple, Suite 2450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
\L a ^ V ?J cM-
{00037314-1} 3 000239 
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H P S Hall Prangte and SoboonvekJ LLC 
Attorneys at Law 
136 E«BI South TfcrYipte. Suite 2450 
Salt Laka City, Utah 04111 
P 6I01.32O.O9O0 
h 801.320.0390 
www Jipsiaw .cot r * 
Mark Riekhof 
801,320.0900 
mrlekhof@hDslaw.com 
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January 13, 2009 
VIA FACSIMILE: (801) 521-6280 & VIA U.S. MAIL 
Matthew A. Steward 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENS0N 
One Utah Center 
201S. Main Street 13* Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Welsh v. Lakevlew Hospital 
HCII Claim No: 120416 
HPS Case Mo,: 0081-0001 
Dear Matthew: 
I am in receipt of your January 12f 2009 correspondence and Just wanted to clarify that I in no way meant 
to imply that you had any Improper ex parte communications with the Court, I simply could not tell from 
the Court's docket what the Court had ordered and therefore did not feel comfortable signing off on the 
Order as to form. With your confirmation that the Court merely granted the Order as requested, I am happy 
to sign off on the Order. I have attached the signature page herewith. 
With respect to the depositions of your experts, if you can see if Dr, Bader is available on any of the 
January dates provided It would be appreciated as I would like to get him deposed prior to my expert 
designation deadline. If we can fit Kelly Johnson (n as well, great, but if not we can take that deposition 
after you have completed your trial. 
You have requested to take the deposition of Mr, Kunard and I believe I can accommodate you in that 
regard. I will contact the hospital and see when he Is available for deposition. I believe I also discussed 
with Nathan taking the deposition of the Welsh's son who Is In charge of their finances. Can you please 
determine when he is available for deposition? 
Lastly, Nathan and I and Gerald Houston had discussed for a couple of years the possibility of getting this 
matter settled. However, we never received any type of demand from Nathan in that regard. I believe we 
would still be interested in at least attempting to see if we can reach an amicable solution to this case. 
Obviously, If we can do that prior to expending time and resources in expert discovery it would be better for 
both of our clients, Is this something your clients would still be interested in pursuing? If so, can you 
please provide us with a demand that we can consider. We might also be willing to participate in 
mediation if it appears It would be helpful for the parties. 
Chicago LM& Veg^s Sou L &UQ C*IY 
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Thank you for your attention to these matters. 
Very truly yours, 
HALL PRANQLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
Mailk A, Riekhof 
000459 
ID 
3. That the Plaintiffs' rebuttal expert reports, if any, shall be provided to Defendant's 
counsel on or before March 27,2009' 
4. That the completion of expert discovery date shall remain Friday, April 24,2009; 
and 
5. That the certification of readiness for trial date shall remain June 29, 2009. 
DATED this day of. 2009. 
Approved as to form: 
JU Martc A. Riekhof 
(00037314-1} 
BY THE COURT; 
Michael G. Allphin 
District Court Judge 
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www.hpslaw.com 
Mark Riekhof 
801.320.0900 
mriekhof®hpslaw,corr) 
February 17, 2009 
VIA FACSIMILE: fSOl) 521-6280 & VIA US. MAIL 
Matthew A. Steward 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENS0N 
One Utah Center 
201S, Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Welsh v. Lakeview Hospital 
HCII Claim No: 120416 
HPS Case No.: 0081-0001 
Dear Matthew: 
I am in receipt of your February 10r 2009 correspondence and accompanying deposition notice. For the 
reasons I will articulate below, we do not believe it is appropriate to have Mr. Kunnard sltfor a deposition 
at this time. 
As you are aware, fact discovery In this matter closed on October 31r 2008, Given the tenor of the Court's 
most recent order denying your request for an extension of time to designate expert witness, I am quite 
hesitant to proceed with discovery that the Court mandated be completed more than three months ago. 
As such, until such time as the Court reverses its prior order, we will not engage in any additional fact 
discovery. 
If you require a formal motion to quash to take this deposition off calendar, please let me know and I wifl 
be happy to file one with the Court. Additionally, if you intend to have a court reporter present to take a 
certificate of non-appearance, please let me know as I will make an appearance and make a record of our 
objection to the deposition. If I do not hear from you in this regard, I will assume you will voluntarily take 
this deposition off calendar, without the need for a motion to quash, and that you will not attempt to take a 
certificate of non-appearance, without notifying me in advance so that I may participate. 
With respect to the depositions of your experts, I do not believe I will need to depose them given the 
Court's current order barring Plaintiffs' from introducing expert testimony at the time of trial. If the judge 
elects to reverse course and allows Plaintiffs the opportunity to introduce expert testimony, I am confident 
that he will allow us ample opportunity to take their depositions. As such, I do not believe we will need to 
schedule those depositions at this time. 
UuVopn* Sail Uakea City 
nnn/on 
9 
I Lastly, I am unclear as to your inquiry Into the insurance policy, I know that the hospital is Insured for 
* several million dollars under the policy in force and effect at the time of this incident If you can clarity why 
9 in fact you are seeking the actual policy at this juncture, I will consider whether it should be produced, 
it * | 
JJ Thank you for your attention to these matters, 
I Very truly yours, 
S HAU. PRANQLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
Mark A. R i e k h o T ^ 
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ERIC P. SCHOONVELD #10900 
MARK A. RIEKHOF #8420 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 2450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-320-0900 
Facsimile: 801-320-0896 
Attorneys for Hospital Corporation of Utah d/b/a hake view Hospital 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE L. WELSH and 
CAROL WELSH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH, 
d/b/a LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, 
Defendant. 
RULE 26(F) AMENDED SCHEDULING 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 060700106 
Judge Michael G. Allthin 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), Nathan B. Wilcox of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, attorneys for Wayne L. Welsh and Carol Welsh, and Gerald W. Huston of Hall Prangle 
& Schoonveld, LLC, attorney for Defendant, discussed this case and agreed upon this Amended 
Scheduling Order. 
1. INITIAL DISCLOSURE: The parties have already exchanged the initial 
information required by Rule 26(a)(1). 
C J 
Q3i3>{00a 
DOCKETED 
2. DISCOVERY PLAN: The parties joindy propose to the court the following 
discovery plan* 
a. Discovery is necessary on all claims and defenses set forth in the parties' 
pleadings. 
b. Fact discovery, including responses to written discovery, will be completed 
no later than Monday, May 19, 2008. All written discovery shall be served 
so as to conform with this deadline. 
c. The parties agree that the following discovery methods may be used, with 
responses due within thirty (30) days of the date of service plus additional 
time for service by mail as provided by Rule 6(b); 
(1) Interrogatories, not to exceed 25; 
(2) Requests for Production of Documents; 
(3) Requests for Admissions; and 
(4) Depositions, not to exceed ten (10) per party and 
one (1) day of seven (7) hours in length per 
deposition. 
d. Plaintiffs' Initial Expert Disclosures and Reports under Rule 26(a)(3) shall be 
served no later than Monday, June 16, 2008. 
e. Plaintiffs' Expert Witnesses shall be deposed by Monday, July 21, 2008. 
f. Defendant's Initial Expert Disclosures and Reports under Rule 26(a)(3) shall 
be served no later than Monday, August 18, 2008. 
2 
g. Defendant's Expert Witnesses shall be deposed by Monday, September 15, 
2008. 
h Rebuttal Reports under Rule 26(e)(1) shall be served no later than Monday, 
September 29, 2008. 
l. Expert discovery will be completed no later than Monday, October 27, 
2008. 
). Supplementations are due as parties discover information or documents 
requiring supplementation 
3 OTHER ITEMS: 
a. The parties do not request a conference with the court prior to entry of the 
scheduling order 
b. The parties request a final pretrial conference in January 2009. 
c. The deadline for filing a motion to amend pleadings shall be Monday, April 
21, 2008. 
d. The deadline for serving dispositive or potential dispositive motions shall be 
Monday, November 24, 2008. 
e. The potential for settlement cannot be determined at this time 
f. The potential foi resolution of this matter through the court's alternative 
dispute resolution program cannot be determined at this time 
g. Final lists of witnesses and exhibits pursuant to Fed R Civ P 26(a)(3) shall be 
served at least thirty (30) days before trial. 
3 
h. The parties should have fourteen (14) days after service of final lists of 
witnesses and exhibits to list objections under Rule 26(a)(3). 
i. This case should be certified for trial by January 2009. 
k. The estimated length of the trial is 4 days. A jury has been demanded. 
DATED this 9 ^ day of January, 2008. 
DATED this day of January, 2008. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
icox 
Jennifer R. Eshelman 
Attorneys for Wayne L. Welsh and Carol Welsh 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
Mark A. Riekhof 
Attorneys for Lakeview Hospital 
4 
h. The parties should have fourteen (14) days after service of final hsts of 
witnesses and exhibits to list objections under Rule 26(a)(3). 
l This case should be certified for trial by January 2009. 
fc. The estimated length of the trial is 4 days. A jury has been demanded 
DATED this C?H day of January, 2008. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
y r DATED this 2 S day of January, 2008. 
Nathan B. yfttcox 
Jennifer R. Eshelman 
Attorneys for Wayne L, Welsh and Carol Welsh 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
fckA.Riekhof 
Attorneys for hakeview Hospital 
4 
ORDER 
The foregoing schedule is hereby adopted and implemented as the governing schedule in 
this case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this \ \ day of_ . 2008. 
BY THE COURT. 
S\ fl\\(Mf .\ fr hWp AJ 
Jtidge Michael G. Allphin 
Third District Court Judge 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
this of January, 2008 to the following: 
Nathan B. Wilcox 
Jennifer R Eshelman 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2006 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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ERIC P. SCHOONVELD #10900 
MARK A. RIEKHOF #8420 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
136 East South Temple, Suite 2450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-320-0900 
Facsimile: 801-320-0896 
Attorneys for Hospital Corporation of Utah d/b/a Lakewew Hospital 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WAYNE L. WELSH and 
CAROL WELSH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF UTAH, 
d/b/a LAKEVIEW HOSPITAL, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATED RULE 26(F) AMENDED 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
CASE NO. 060700106 
Judge Michael G. Allthin 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), Nathan B. Wilcox of Clyde Snow Sessions & 
Swenson, attorney for Wayne L. Welsh and Carol Welsh, and Gerald W. Huston of Hall Prangle & 
Schoonveld, LLC, attorney for Defendant, discussed this case and agreed upon this Amended 
Scheduling Order. 
1. INITIAL DISCLOSURE: The parties have already exchanged the initial 
information required by Rule 26(a)(1). 
2. DISCOVERY PLAN: The parties jointly propose to the court the following 
discovery plan: 
a. Discovery is necessary on all claims and defenses set forth in the parties' 
pleadings. 
b. Fact discovery will be completed no later than Friday, October 31, 2008. 
All written discovery shall be served so as to conform with this deadline. 
c. The parties agree that the following discovery methods may be used, with 
responses due within thirty (30) days of the date of service plus additional 
time for service by mail as provided by Rule 6(b); 
(1) Interrogatories, not to exceed 25; 
(2) Requests for Production of Documents; 
(3) Requests for Admissions; and 
(4) Depositions, not to exceed ten (10) per party and 
one (1) day of seven (7) hours in length per 
deposition. 
d. Plaintiffs' Initial Expert Disclosures and Reports under Rule 26(a)(3) shall be 
served no later than Monday, December 1, 2008. 
e. Plaintiffs' Expert Witnesses shall be deposed by Friday, January 2, 2009. 
f. Defendant's Initial Expert Disclosures and Reports under Rule 26(a)(3) shall 
be served no later than Friday, January 30, 2009. 
2 
g. Defendant's Expert Witnesses shall be deposed by Friday, February 27, 
2009. 
h. Rebuttal Reports under Rule 26(e)(1) shall be served no later than Friday, 
March 27, 2009. 
l. Expert discovery will be completed no later than Friday, April 24, 2009. 
). Supplementations are due as parties discover information or documents 
requiring supplementation 
3. OTHER ITEMS: 
a. The parties do not request a conference with the court prior to entry of the 
scheduling order. 
b. The parties request a final pretrial conference in April 2009. 
c. The deadline for filing a motion to amend pleadings shall be Friday, 
November 14, 2008. 
d. The deadline for serving dispositive or potential dispositive motions shall be 
Friday, May 11, 2009. 
e. The potential for setdement cannot be determined at this time. 
f. The potential for resolution of this matter through the court's alternative 
dispute resolution program cannot be determined at this time. 
g. The deadline for holding an initial mediation or other formal setdement 
conference or, in the alternative, determining such an alternative dispute 
3 
resolution process is not likely to be of assistance is Friday, October 17, 
2008. 
h. Final lists of witnesses and exhibits pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(3) shall be 
served at least thirty (30) days before trial. 
i. The parties should have fourteen (14) days after service of final lists of 
witnesses and exhibits to list objections under Rule 26(a)(3). 
j . This case should be certified for trial by June 2009. 
k. The estimated length of the trial is 5 days. A jury has been demanded. 
2008. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
DATED this S*0 ^ day of August, 
DATED this Z-S "~ day of August, 2008. 
Nathin B. Wilcox / 
Attorneys for Wayne L. Welsh and Carol Welsh 
HALL PRANGLE & SCHOONVELD, LLC 
Stephen Alderman 
Attorneys for Lakeview Hospital 
ORDER 
The foregoing schedule is hereby adopted and implemented as the governing schedule in 
this case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 3 o ~ ^ day of S L ^ J " ~ , 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
Third District Court Judge 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATED RULE 26(F) 
AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this hO day of Augrfst, 
2008 to the following: C ^ O C>\ 
Nathan B. Wilcox 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center 
201 S. Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
Jennifer R. Eshelman 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2006 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
\i^\^^t^liW) 
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